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**Calleo 10**, Director – European Studies Program and Professor @ SAIS, (David P, “American Decline Revisited,” *Survival*, 52:4, 215 – 227)

The history of the past two decades suggests that adjusting to a plural world is not easy for the United States. As its economic strength is increasingly challenged by relative decline, it clings all the more to its peerless military prowess. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, that overwhelming military power, evolved over the Cold War, is less and less effective. In many respects, America's geopolitical imagination seems frozen in the posture of the Cold War. The lingering pretension to be the dominant power everywhere has encouraged the United States to hazard two unpromising land wars, plus a diffuse and interminable struggle against 'terrorism'. Paying for these wars and the pretensions behind them confirms the United States in a new version of Cold War finance. Once more, unmanageable fiscal problems poison the currency, an old pathology that firmly reinstates the nation on its path to decline. It was the hegemonic Cold War role, after all, that put the United States so out of balance with the rest of the world economy. In its hegemonic Cold War position, the United States found it necessary to run very large deficits and was able to finance them simply by creating and exporting more and more dollars. The consequence is today's restless mass of accumulated global money. Hence, whereas the value of all global financial assets in 1980 was just over 100% of global output, by 2008, even after the worst of the financial implosion, that figure had exploded to just under 300%.25 Much of this is no doubt tied up in the massive but relatively inert holdings of the Chinese and Japanese. But thanks to today's instantaneous electronic transfers, huge sums can be marshalled and deployed on very short notice. It is this excess of volatile money that arguably fuels the world's great recurring bubbles. It can create the semblance of vast real wealth for a time, but can also (with little notice) sow chaos in markets, wipe out savings and dry up credit for real investment. What constitutes a morbid overstretch in the American political economy thus ends up as a threat to the world economy in general. To lead itself and the world into a more secure future the United States must put aside its old, unmeasured geopolitical ambitions paid for by unlimited cheap credit. Instead, the United States needs a more balanced view of its role in history. But America's post-Soviet pundits have, unfortunately, proved more skilful at perpetuating outmoded dreams of past glory than at promoting the more modest visions appropriate to a plural future. One can always hope that newer generations of Americans will find it easier to adjust to pluralist reality. The last administration, however, was not very encouraging in this regard. III What about Barack Obama? So far, his economic policy has shown itself probably more intelligent and certainly more articulate than his predecessor's. His thinking is less hobbled by simple-minded doctrines. It accepts government's inescapable role in regulating markets and providing a durable framework for orderly governance and societal fellowship. To be sure, the Obama administration, following in the path of the Bush administration, has carried short-term counter-cyclical stimulation to a previously unimagined level. Perhaps so radical an expansion of credit is unavoidable under present circumstances. The administration is caught between the need to rebalance by scaling back and the fear that restraint applied now will trigger a severe depression. Obama's chief aide, Rahm Emanuel, is famous for observing: 'Rule one: Never allow a crisis to go to waste. They are opportunities to do big things.'26 So far, Obama's administration has made use of its crisis to promote an unprecedented expansion of welfare spending.27 Much of the spending is doubtless good in itself and certainly serves the administration's strong counter-cyclical purposes. But at some point the need to pass from expansion to stabilisation will presumably be inescapable. Budget cuts will have to be found somewhere, and demographic trends suggest that drastic reductions in civilian welfare spending are unlikely. Elementary prudence might suggest that today's financial crisis is an ideal occasion for America's long-overdue retreat from geopolitical overstretch, a time for bringing America's geopolitical pretensions into harmony with its diminishing foreign possibilities and expanding domestic needs. The opportunities for geopolitical saving appear significant. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), current military plans will require an average military budget of $652bn (in 2010 dollars) each year through 2028. The estimate optimistically assumes only 30,000 troops will be engaged abroad after 2013. As the CBO observes, these projections exceed the peak budgets of the Reagan administration's military build-up of the mid-1980s (about $500bn annually in 2010 dollars). This presumes a military budget consuming 3.5% of GDP through 2020.28 Comparable figures for other nations are troubling: 2.28% for the United Kingdom, 2.35% for France, 2.41% for Russia and 1.36% for China.29 Thus, while the financial crisis has certainly made Americans fear for their economic future, it does not yet seem to have resulted in a more modest view of the country's place in the world, or a more prudent approach to military spending. Instead, an addiction to hegemonic status continues to blight the prospects for sound fiscal policy. Financing the inevitable deficits inexorably turns the dollar into an imperial instrument that threatens the world with inflation.

**The alternative is Chinese failed attempts at heg which link to their turns but doesn’t solve any of our offense**

**Brezezinski 12** [Zbigniew. National Security Advisor for the Carter Administration, Professor of Foreign Policy @ Johns Hopkins. “After America” Foreign Policy, 1/3/12. ln]

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, **the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international s**tatus **quo reinforced by America's global preeminence** -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

# a/t: monteiro

**Monteiro’s wrong**

**Busby 12**, Josh, assistant professor of public affairs at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs [“Josh Busby on Unipolarity and International Relations,” January 6th, http://www.strausscenter.org/strauss-news/josh-busby-on-unipolarity-and-international-relations.html]

Strauss Scholar, Joshua Busby, wrote a three-part piece on the blog The Duck of Minerva, responding to two articles published by University of Chicago scholars Nuno Monteiro, and Sebastian Rosato and John Schuessler. The articles, and Busby’s response, focus on international relations, unipolarity and the realist approach to foreign policy. Busby’s first post critiques Nuno Monteiro’s article, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful” published in International Security. Monteiro argued that unipolarity has been less peaceful than other time periods. Busby disagrees with this argument, citing the contemporary era may create a “presentist bias” due to the overemphasis of our own lived experience and the omnipresence of the news media. Finally Busby addressed Moneiro’s argument that unipolarity drives conflict. Busby argues that **domestic-level factors in** both the United States and **potential adversaries, rather than U.S. power** alone, help explain recent conflicts.

**Monteiro agrees the alt doesn’t solve**

**Cambanis 12**, Thanassis, journalist, expert on Mideast policy[“The lonely superpower,” January 22nd, <http://articles.boston.com/2012-01-22/ideas/30646076_1_cold-war-nuclear-war-arms-race/5>]

Not everyone agrees that the United States would benefit from having a major rival. The best-known academic authority on American unipolarity, Dartmouth College political scientist William C. Wohlforth, argues that it’s still far better to be alone at the top. Overall, Wohlforth says, America spends less of its budget on defense than during the Cold War, and fewer Americans are killed in the conflicts in which it does engage. “Those who wish to have a peer competitor back are mistaken,” he said. “They forget the huge interventions of the Cold War.” Between 1945 and 1989, Wohlforth says, proxy wars between America and the Soviet Union killed hundreds of thousands of people, against the backdrop of a very real and terrifying threat of nuclear annihilation. Today, he says, the world is still dangerous, but it’s much less deadly and frightening than it was in the time of the nuclear arms race. For his part, Monteiro agrees that the Cold War was nasty and scary; he just wants to debunk the notion that what came next was any better. **According to Monteiro, bipolarity and unipolarity** pose different kinds of dangers, but **are equally problematic**.

**Concedes heg is key to solve great power war**

**Monteiro 11** \*Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University [<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064>, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful”]

In addition, Wohlforth claims that wars among major powers are unlikely, because the unipole will prevent conflict from erupting among important states. He writes, “The sole pole’s power advantages matter only to the degree that it is engaged, and it is most likely to be engaged in politics among the other major powers. 44 **I agree** that if the unipole were to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance, major power wars would be unlikely. Yet, there is no compelling reason to expect that it will always follow such a course. Should the unipole decide to disengage, as Wohlforth implies, **major power wars would be possible**

**Heg solves the impact**

**Brzezinski 12** - National Security Advisor in the Carter Administration, Professor of Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University (Zbigniew 2012 “Strategic Vision: America and the crisis for global power” book

Last but not least, even though China and India today maintain a responsible nuclear posture of minimal deterrence and “no first use,” the uncertainty of an increasingly nuclear world could force both states to reevaluate and escalate their nuclear posture. Indeed, they as well as Russia might even become inclined to extend nuclear assurances to their respective client states. **Not only could this signal** a renewed regional nuclear arms race **between these three aspiring powers but it could also create new and antagonistic spheres of influence in Eurasia driven by competitive nuclear deterrence.** The decline of the United States would thus precipitate drastic changes to the nuclear domain. An increase in proliferation among insecure American allies and/or an arms race between the emerging Asian powers are among the more likely outcomes. This ripple effect of proliferation would undermine the transparent management of the nuclear domain and increase the likelihood of interstate rivalry, miscalculation, and eventually even perhaps of international nuclear terror.

# a/t: balancing

**Won’t happen**

**Wohlforth 12**, William, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of. Foreign Service at Georgetown University [“How Not to Evaluate Theories,” International Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 219–222]

For nearly 20 years, Layne, Kenneth Waltz, and other balance-of-power realists have proclaimed multipolarity’s imminent return. They have been crystal clear in identifying balancing as the chief causal mechanism that would produce this outcome. Their argument attracted so much attention in large part because it was simple and appeared to flow logically from their theory: ‘‘overwhelming power repels and leads others to try to balance against it’’ (Waltz 2000:28). As Layne (1993:92) stressed, ‘‘balancing has especially strong explanatory power in accounting for the [fact] that unipolarity tends to be short-lived …’’ He predicted that ‘‘Unipolarity will stimulate the emergence of eligible states as great powers, [and will] cause other states to balance against the United States’’ (Layne 1993:51). Waltz (1997:915) agreed: ‘‘Some of the weaker states in the system will … act to restore a balance and move the system back to bi- or multipolarity.’’ In all of the many papers they wrote on the subject, Layne and Waltz consistently claimed to see balancing processes already under way. ‘‘Multipolarity is developing before our eyes,’’ Waltz (1997:915) wrote. ‘‘To all but the myopic, it can already be seen on the horizon. Moreover, it is emerging in according with the balancing imperative’’ (Waltz 1997:915). In my 1999 article, I argued that Layne, Waltz, and other realists were using a theory whose scope conditions did not obtain (Wohlforth 1999). Their theory predicts reactions to a rising power that might attain preponderance, not responses to a state whose preponderance is already firmly established. Even if one accepted the veracity of the whole Waltzian project, I argued, a properly specified theory predicted that unipolarity would be peaceful and durable: peaceful because two key causes for great-power war—systemic balancing and counterhegemonic rivalry—were absent (cf. Monteiro 2012) and durable because the speedy route to equilibrium— balancing—was for all practical purposes not in the cards. My arguments for why balancing was so unlikely came straight from standard realist theory. In a nutshell, the size and comprehensiveness of the capabilities gap meant contenders had a long way to go, and unipolarity’s geography (America’s offshore location, the contenders for peer status all clustered in or around Eurasia) meant that local balancing was likely to impede internal or external efforts to restore systemic equilibrium.

**Bad scholarship**

**Wohlforth 12**, William, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of. Foreign Service at Georgetown University [“How Not to Evaluate Theories,” International Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 219–222]

At issue are not the facts, but their implications for scholarship. How come every theoretical implication Layne seeks to draw from these facts strikes me as clearly wrong? Cycling between the earlier writings of Layne and other balance-of-power realists, my own work, and Layne’s present essay yields an answer: a lack of analytical consistency. On vivid display in ‘‘This Time It’s Real,’’ this inconsistency is hardly random. Rather, it is all skewed toward an effort to claim that recent events vindicate Layne’s and other balance-of-power realists’ prediction from the early 1990s: unipolarity generates systemic pressures that rapidly move the system back to multipolarity. I argued elsewhere (Wohlforth 1999) that this prediction derives from an unreflective and ultimately flawed application of neorealist balance-of power theory to a novel unipolar setting. **There was no theoretical basis for the prediction that unipolarity would spark balancing that would rapidly usher in multipolarity**. And, as it turns out, there is no evidence that this has occurred or is about to occur. Layne is only able to imply otherwise by committing four serious analytical missteps.

**heg causes bandwagoning solves balancing**

**Zhang and Shi 11** - 1/22 – \*Yuhan Zhang is a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.; Lin Shi is from Columbia University. She also serves as an independent consultant for the Eurasia Group and a consultant for the World Bank in Washington, D.C. (America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/>)

Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one **where great power wars** re**-emerge**, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

**Transition wars**

**Evans 10**, Michael, Fellow at the Australian Defence College, Canberra [“Power and Paradox: Asian Geopolitics and Sino-American Relations in the 21st Century,” Seapower: The Official Publication of the Navy League of the United States, vol 53. 2 (Feb. 2010), pp. 12-15]

The primacist, or ‘‘strategic competition’’ school, takes a hard-edged realist view of Asia’s future as portrayed by Western scholars and defense analysts such as Aaron L. Friedberg, John J. Mearsheimer, Robyn Lim and Hugh White.13 They argue that Europe’s pre-1945 past is likely to be Asia’s future. In their view, Asia eerily resembles Europe of the belle e´poque prior to 1914. China’s rise in twenty-first century Asia is analogous to that of nineteenth century Imperial Germany in Europe with Beijing emerging as an inevitable strategic competitor of the U.S. In Friedberg’s now famous phrase, the region is ‘‘ripe for rivalry.’’14 Hugh White sums up the prevailing wisdom of the primacist school namely, that, in understanding balance of power relationships, ‘‘there seems no better way to frame questions about Asia’s future than in terms of the European past.’’15 For the primacists there is a zero-sum game of power politics at work in Asia that differs little from Thucydides’s famous observation about the Peloponnesian War: ‘‘the growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable.’’16 Transpose China for Athens and Sparta for the United States and we have John Mearsheimer’s doctrine of offensive realism based on the ‘‘tragedy of great power politics.’’ As Mearsheimer writes, ‘‘the question at hand is simple and profound: will China rise peacefully? My answer is no.’’ If China continues its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades ‘‘intense security competition’’ will occur with considerable potential for war.17 Similarly, Robyn Lim notes, that the competitive interaction of economic development, military technology, strategic geography and national interest makes a future systemic crisis among the ‘‘quadrilateral powers’’ of the United States, China, Japan and Russia not simply thinkable but highly likely. Economic interdependence, the spread of democracy and multilateralism are unlikely to act as countervailing solvents to the traditional dynamics of great power conflict.18 In particular, great power strategic competition is likely to create an adversarial relationship between Beijing and Washington. As a result, in White’s words, ‘‘war in Asia remains thinkable because the international order that has kept the peace for more than 30 years is under pressure.’’19 For primacists, then, competition between rising and dominant great powers is a fixed historical rule. As David Shambaugh has observed, ‘‘zero sum competition is a virtual law of international relations, at least for the realist school.’’20 In an anarchic international system, Sino-American strategic competition is inevitable and, given China’s rapid rise, a ‘‘power transition’’ struggle is likely. In consequence, the United States as the dominant power has little choice but to keep its Asian alliance system in good order— particularly the Japanese alliance—if it is to contain China’s rise in the long term. In this context, it is no accident that within the second Bush Administration, Richard Armitage, as Deputy Secretary of State, advocated a calibrated upgrading of the U.S.-Japanese alliance describing Japan as the United States’ ‘‘Great Britain of the East.’’21 Primacists believe that Deng Xiaoping’s late twentieth century strategy of capitalist economic growth will translate into a twenty-first century challenge to the U.S. brokered status quo. They point to Chinese military modernization in general, and to its anti-access/area-denial missile strategy in particular, to highlight their concerns. As Friedberg puts it, the United States is increasingly threatened by ‘‘a combination of [Chinese] torpedoes, high-speed cruise missiles and land-based ballistic missiles’’ designed to cripple the great symbol of U.S. power-projection in Asia, namely its carrier fleet.22 Others highlight China’s stealthy ‘‘string of pearls’’ strategy of ‘‘building presence’’— that stretches through the South China littorals, the Strait of Malacca across the Indian Ocean and on to the Persian Gulf—as a precursor to future expeditionary bases in countries such as Pakistan, Burma, Bangladesh, Cambodia and along the Horn of Africa.23 The primacist view of inevitable great power competition is supported by several observers of Chinese naval development, such as Mayan Chanda, James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, who foresee the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) transitioning froma defensive anti-access force into a fully-fledged offensive blue water fleet.24 For Chanda, China is in the process of developing a ‘‘crouching tiger, swimming dragon’’ strategy based on ‘‘creeping assertiveness’’ towards the projection of long-range naval capability and the acquisition of expeditionary forces.25 Similarly, in their various publications on Chinese naval ambitions, Holmes and Yoshihara also argue that China, traditionally a continental power, is gradually turning its geopolitical ambitions seaward. Three reasons explain Beijing’s ‘‘turn to Mahan.’’ First, the traditional landward threats China once faced from Central Asia are now much diminished because relations with Russia are relatively stable. As a result, future conflict is far more likely in China’s oceanic periphery, not its continental hinterlands. Second, China’s huge energy dependence on foreign oil demands the development of a Mahanian bluewater fleet to secure its sea lines of communications in the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca. Third, of course, there is the Taiwan imperative. In the South China Sea, Taiwan is ‘‘the Gibraltar of the East’’ and holds the strategic central position off China’s mainland in the island chain overlooking the Western Pacific and so controls the throat of the Malacca Strait that is vital to Chinese economic prosperity.26 For Holmes and Yoshihara, these strategic realities suggest that, in the long term, China will, like the Kaiser’s Germany before it, manifest a powerful ‘‘strategic will’’ to develop an oceanic navy. Consequently, it is folly for Western analysts to believe that Beijing will settle for the maritime status quo and thus permanent naval inferiority in the form of its current asymmetric strategy of anti-access sea denial. Such a strategy is unlikely to endure as China grows richer and more powerful. Over the next two decades, the U.S. Navy must re-study Tirpitz and Wegener and expect the emergence of a powerful twenty-first century Chinese version of the German High Seas fleet.27 Holmes and Yoshihara conclude pessimistically that ‘‘the combination of permissive [continental] surroundings, burgeoning resources, and indomitable strategic will promises to make China a more formidable, more determined competitor at sea than Germany ever was.’’28

**Plan solves military oil entanglement**

Buis ’12 (Tom Buis, CEO, Growth Energy, Co-written by Buis and Growth Energy Board Co-Chair Gen. Wesley K. Clark (Ret.), “American Families Need American Fuel”, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/powering-our-military-whats-th.php>, May 23, 2012, LEQ)

Our nation is dangerously dependent on foreign oil. We import some 9 million barrels per day, or over 3 billion barrels per year; the U.S. military itself comprises two percent of the nation’s total petroleum use, making it the world’s largest consumer of energy and oil imports. Of U.S. foreign oil imports, one out of five barrels comes from unfriendly nations and volatile areas, including at least 20 percent stemming from the Persian Gulf, including Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Further, our nation heavily relies on hot-beds of extremism, as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Nigeria are our third, fourth, and fifth, respectively, largest exporters of oil. How dangerous is this? Very! Not only does America’s huge appetite for oil entangle us into complicated relationships with nations marred by unstable political, economic, and security situations, it also gravely impacts our military, who risk their lives daily to protect foreign energy supply routes. Because of our addiction to oil, we have been in almost constant military conflict, lost more than 6,500 soldiers and created a whole new class of wounded warriors, thousands of whom will need long-term care funded by our government. One in eight soldiers killed or wounded in Iraq from 2003-2007 were protecting fuel convoys, with a total of 3,000 Army casualties alone. We maintain extra military forces at an annual cost of about $150 billion annually, just to assure access to foreign oil - because we know that if that stream of 9 million barrels per day is seriously interrupted, our economy will crash. That's what I call dangerously dependent. Even worse, according to a new Bloomberg Government analysis, Pentagon spending on fuel is dramatically increasing. This will force the military to dedicate even more funds toward energy costs, at the expense of other priorities, like training and paying soldiers. In fact, every $.25 increase in the cost of jet fuel makes a $1 billion difference in the Department of Defense’s bottom line – a debt that will be passed along to the American taxpayer. And if that's not enough to make you want to avoid foreign oil, then consider this: every dollar hike in the international, politically-rigged price of oil hands Iran about $3 million more per day, that their regime can use to sow mischief, fund terrorism, and develop missiles and nuclear weapons. Enough is enough! We have domestic alternatives that can protect American interests, and promote prosperity and security – including, more domestic oil production, using natural gas and biofuels, like ethanol, as fuel, converting coal to liquid fuel, and moving as rapidly as possible to vehicles powered by green energy. By introducing clean energy and fuel alternatives, this would rapidly reduce both the strain of securing foreign energy supply routes in unstable regions, as well as unnecessary economic and political entanglement with volatile regimes. It is imperative the U.S. military leverage its position as a leader and enact pertinent energy policies to best enhance American energy – and national – security.

**Those escalate and turn their offense**

Collina 5 (Executive Director of 20-20 Vision, Tom Z. Collina, Executive Director of 20-20Vision; testimony in front of Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs United States Senate “Oil Dependence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Real Dangers, Realistic Solutions”. October 19, 2005 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2005_hr/051020-collina.pdf>)

More conflicts in the Middle East America imports almost 60% of its oil today and, at this rate, we’ll import 70% by 2025. Where will that oil come from? Two-thirds of the world’s oil is in the Middle East, primarily in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. The United States has less than 3% of global oil. The Department of Energy predicts that North American oil imports from the Persian Gulf will double from 2001 to 2025.i Other oil suppliers, such as Venezuela, Russia, and West Africa, are also politically unstable and hold no significant long-term oil reserves compared to those in the Middle East. Bottom line: our economy and security are increasingly dependent on one of the most unstable regions on earth. Unless we change our ways, we will find ourselves even more at the mercy of Middle East oil and thus more likely to get involved in future conflicts. The greater our dependence on oil, the greater the pressure to protect and control that oil. The growing American dependence on imported oil is the primary driver of U.S. foreign and military policy today, particularly in the Middle East, and motivates an aggressive military policy now on display in Iraq. To help avoid similar wars in the future and to encourage a more cooperative, responsible, and multilateral foreign policy the United States must significantly reduce its oil use. Before the Iraq war started, Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said: “Regardless of whether we say so publicly, we will go to war, because Saddam sits at the center of a region with more than 60 percent of all the world's oil reserves.” Unfortunately, he was right. In fact, the use of military power to protect the flow of oil has been a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy since 1945. That was the year that President Franklin D. Roosevelt promised King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia that the United States would protect the kingdom in return for special access to Saudi oil—a promise that governs U.S. foreign policy today. This policy was formalized by President Jimmy Carter in 1980 when he announced that the secure flow of oil from the Persian Gulf was in “the vital interests of the United States of America” and that America would use “any means necessary, including military force” to protect those interests from outside forces. This doctrine was expanded by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 to cover internal threats, and was used by the first President Bush to justify the Gulf War of 1990-91, and provided a key, if unspoken rationale for the second President Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003.ii The Carter/Reagan Doctrine also led to the build up of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf on a permanent basis and to the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The United States now spends over $50 Billion per year (in peacetime) to maintain our readiness to intervene in the Gulf.iii America has tried to address its oil vulnerability by using our military to protect supply routes and to prop up or install friendly regimes. But as Iraq shows the price is astronomical—$200 Billion and counting. Moreover, it doesn’t work—Iraq is now producing less oil than it did before the invasion. While the reasons behind the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq may be complex, can anyone doubt that we would not be there today if Iraq exported coffee instead of oil? It is time for a new approach. Americans are no longer willing to support U.S. misadventures in the Persian Gulf. Recent polls show that almost two-thirds of Americans think the Iraq war was not worth the price in terms of blood and treasure. Lt. Gen William Odom, director of the National Security Agency during President Reagan's second term, recently said: "The invasion of Iraq will turn out to be the greatest strategic disaster in U.S. history." The nation is understandably split about what to do now in Iraq, but there appears to be widespread agreement that America should not make the same mistake again—and we can take a giant step toward that goal by reducing our dependence on oil.

**Heg solves Pakistan conflict**

**Brzezinski 12**, National Security Advisor under US President Jimmy Carter [“8 Geopolitically Endangered Species: Meet the weaker countries that will suffer from American decline,” Foreign Policy Issue January/February, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/8_geopolitically_endangered_species?page=0,0>]

Although Islamabad is armed with 21st-century nuclear weapons and held together by a professional late 20th-century army, the majority of Pakistan is still pre-modern, rural, and largely defined by regional and tribal identities. Conflict with India defines Pakistan's sense of national identity, while the forcible division of Kashmir sustains a shared and profound antipathy. Pakistan's political instability is its greatest vulnerability, and a decline in U.S. power would reduce America's ability to aid Pakistan's consolidation and development. Pakistan could then transform into a state run by the military, a radical Islamic state, a state that combined both military and Islamic rule, or a "state" with no centralized government at all.

At stake: Nuclear warlordism; a militant Islamic, anti-Western, nuclear-armed government similar to Iran's; regional instability in Central Asia, with violence potentially spreading to China, India, and Russia.

**Nuclear war**

**Pitt, 9** - a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence." (5/8/09, William, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,” http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183)

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But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all. Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the world.The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century. The fact that Pakistan, and India, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open the very gates of Hell itself.

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Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools. About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their rule. The United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that **Pakistan could collapse** under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. "As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spinesof those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario. If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be galvanized into military action of some kind, as could nuclear-armed China or nuclear-armed Russia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured, the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the **entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster**. We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.

# 2ac incentive

**we meet – we give the industry money and tax credits**

**Epa.gov 12** [“Solar Power Purchase Agreements,” May 24th, <http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/buygp/solarpower.htm>]

A Solar Power Purchase Agreement (SPPA) is a financial arrangement in which a third-party developer owns, operates, and maintains the photovoltaic (PV) system, and a host customer agrees to site the system on its roof or elsewhere on its property and purchases the system’s electric output from the solar services provider for a predetermined period. This financial arrangement allows the host customer to receive stable, and sometimes lower cost electricity, while the solar services provider or another party acquires valuable financial benefits such as tax credits and income generated from the sale of electricity to the host customer.

**DoE says we’re T**

**Waxman 98 –** Solicitor General of the US (Seth, Brief for the United States in Opposition for the US Supreme Court case HARBERT/LUMMUS AGRIFUELS PROJECTS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/1998/0responses/98-0697.resp.opp.pdf)

2 On November 15, 1986, Keefe was delegated “the authority, with respect to actions valued at $50 million or less, to approve, execute, enter into, modify, administer, closeout, terminate and take any other necessary and appropriate action (collectively, ‘Actions’) with respect to Financial Incentive awards.” Pet. App. 68, 111-112. Citing DOE Order No. 5700.5 (Jan. 12, 1981), the delegation defines “Financial Incentives” as the authorized financial incentive programs of DOE, “including direct loans, loan guarantees, purchase agreements, price supports, guaranteed market agreements and any others which may evolve.” The delegation proceeds to state, “[h]owever, a separate prior written approval of any such action must be given by or concurred in by Keefe to accompany the action.” The delegation also states that its exercise “shall be governed by the rules and regulations of [DOE] and policies and procedures prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate(s).” Pet. App. 111-113.

**Interpretation – incentives are the disbursement of public funds**

**Gielecki 1**, Mark, economist with the Energy Information Administration, Fred Mayes, Senior Technical Advisor for the coal, nuclear, and renewables program within the EIA, Lawrence Prete, retired from the EIA, [“Incentives, Mandates, and Government Programs for Promoting Renewable Energy,” February, <http://lobby.la.psu.edu/_107th/128_PURPA/Agency_Activities/EIA/Incentive_Mandates_and_Government.htm>]

Over the years, incentives and mandates for renewable energy have been used to advance different energy policies, such as ensuring energy security or promoting environmentally benign energy sources. Renewable energy has beneficial attributes, such as low emissions and replenishable energy supply, that are not fully reflected in the market price. Accordingly, governments have used a variety of programs to promote renewable energy resources, technologies, and renewable-based transportation fuels. (1) This paper discusses: (1) financial incentives and regulatory mandates used by Federal and State governments and Federal research and development (R&D), (2), (3) and (2) their effectiveness in promoting renewables. A financial incentive is defined in this report as providing one or more of the following benefits: A transfer of economic resources by the Government to the buyer or seller of a good or service that has the effect of reducing the price paid, or, increasing the price received, respectively; Reducing the cost of production of the good or service; or, Creating or expanding a market for producers. The intended effect of a financial incentive is to increase the production or consumption of the good or service over what it otherwise would have been without the incentive. Examples of financial incentives are: tax credits, production payments, trust funds, and low-cost loans. Research and development is included as a support program because its effect is to decrease cost, thus enhancing the commercial viability of the good(s) provided. (4)

**aff ground – they destroy nuclear affs which are the heart of the topic – outweighs because it’s a prerequisite to clash**

**Good is good enough – competing interpretations forces a race to the bottom and judge intervention – this is no less arbitrary than deciding limits are key**

# 2ac cp

**Links to politics**

**Perm do both**

# 2ac microgrid

**Perm do both**

**Doesn’t solve fuel convoy or budget internals**

**Only smr’s solve the grid – renewables fail**

Charles Barton 11, founder of the Nuclear Green Revolution blog, MA in philosophy, “Future storm damage to the grid may carry unacceptable costs”, April 30, <http://nucleargreen.blogspot.com/2011_04_01_archive.html>

Amory Lovins has long argued that the traditional grid is vulnerable to this sort of damage. Lovins proposed a paradigm shift from centralized to distributed generation and from fossil fuels and nuclear power to renewable based micro-generation. Critics have pointed to flaws in Lovins model. Renewable generation systems are unreliable and their output varies from locality to locality, as well as from day to day, and hour to hour. In order to bring greater stability and predictability to the grid, electrical engineers have proposed expanding the electrical transmission system with thousands of new miles of transmission cables to be added to bring electricity from high wind and high sunshine areas, to consumers. This would lead, if anything, to greater grid vulnerability to storm damage in a high renewable penetration situation. Thus Lovins renewables/distributed generation model breaks down in the face of renewables limitations. Renewables penetration, will increase the distance between electrical generation facilities and customer homes and businesses, increasing the grid vulnerable to large scale damage, rather than enhancing reliability. Unfortunately Lovins failed to note that the distributed generation model actually worked much better with small nuclear power plants than with renewable generated electricity. Small nuclear plants could be located much closer to customer's homes, decreasing the probability of storm damage to transmission lines. At the very worst, small NPPs would stop the slide toward increased grid expansion. Small reactors have been proposed as electrical sources for isolated communities that are too remote for grid hookups. If the cost of small reactors can be lowered sufficiently it might be possible for many and perhaps even most communities to unhook from the grid while maintaining a reliable electrical supply. It is likely that electrical power will play an even more central role in a post-carbon energy era. Increased electrical dependency requires increased electrical reliability, and grid vulnerabilities limit electrical reliability. Storm damage can disrupt electrical service for days and even weeks. In a future, electricity dependent economy, grid damage can actually impede storm recovery efforts, making large scale grid damage semi-self perpetuating. Such grid unreliability becomes a threat to public health and safety. Thus grid reliability will be a more pressing future issue, than it has been. It is clear that renewable energy sources will worsen grid reliability, Some renewable advocates have suggested that the so called "smart grid" will prevent grid outages. Yet the grid will never be smart enough to repair its own damaged power lines. In addition the "smart grid" will be venerable to hackers, and would be a handy target to statures. A smart grid would be an easy target for a Stuxnet type virus attack. Not only does the "smart grid" not solve the problem posed by grid vulnerability to storm damage, but efficiency, another energy approach thought to be a panacea for electrical supply problems would be equally useless. Thus, decentralized electrical generation through the use of small nuclear power plants offers real potential for increasing electrical reliability, but successful use of renewable electrical generation approaches may worsen rather than improved grid reliability.

**Links to net benefit**

# 2ac prolif

**SMRs solve IAEA overstretch**

C. Scherer, Los Alamos Natl Laboratory, et al. R. Bean, Idaho Natl Laboratory, M. Mullen, Los Alamos Natl Laboratory, and G. Pshakin, State Scientific Centre of the Russian Federation-Institute for Physics and Power Engineering, 2010 (http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/Symposium/2010/Documents/PapersRepository/164.pdf)

Abstract: Incorporating safeguards early in the design process can enhance the safeguardability of a nuclear facility by influencing and becoming part of the intrinsic design. This concept is transformational because historically safeguarding nuclear facilities was often considered after completion of the facility design or even construction of the facility. Safeguards concepts and applications were therefore retrofit to the design. By designing safeguards into the facility practical solutions from best practices and lessons learned can be implemented, thus improving the safeguardability of the facility and making safeguards more efficient and cost effective for both the plant operator and international inspectors. A methodology for integrating Safeguards-by-Design early into the facility design process is proposed. The architecture field uses the following design phases: Planning, Schematic, Design Development, and Construction Documents. During the Planning phase defining functions and listing requirements for the facility is essential; at this time safeguards requirements should be documented and become part of the facility functions and requirements list. The schematic phase is the beginning of early design drawings; the design addresses the functions and requirements needs, space utilization begins and the facility design begins taking on volume and shape. Early planning allows evaluation and incorporation of improved solutions from best practices and lessons learned. The safeguardability of the facility could become part of the intrinsic design. It is during the planning and into the schematic design phases that the customer or facility operator has the most influence on the design. Considering International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards verification requirements at this design stage, allows for inclusion of concepts that maximize efficiency and minimize inspection impact. Design changes during the Design Development, and later design phases tend to be very costly; at later stages of the design process, design changes are retrofit into the existing space envelope and are generally much less efficient and economical. Planning for safeguards early in the design process therefore has benefit to both the facility operator and IAEA inspectors. With the emerging nuclear renaissance IAEA inspections will need to be more efficient and economical. Safeguards-by-Design offers a process to design in this efficiency for both the facility operator and the IAEA inspectors. Safeguards experts from the United States and the Russian Federation are cooperating to jointly develop and demonstrate this safeguards-by-design concept for advanced nuclear energy systems.

**Plan solves rogue prolif**

**Goodby and Heiskanen 12**¸ James, former arms control negotiator and a Hoover Institution Fellow, Markku, Associate and Program Director of The Asia Institute at the Kyung Hee University in Seoul [“The Seoul Nuclear Security Summit: New Thinking in Northeast Asia?” March 20th, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/the-seoul-nuclear-security-summit-new-thinking-in-northeast-asia/>]

The nuclear crises in the Middle East and Northeast Asia and the stalled promise of a nuclear renaissance in civil nuclear power could all be solved by a more rational approach to the generation of electric power. Although it will take years before the current, outdated system is replaced, the Seoul meeting could provide a political impetus. The new system would rest on three legs: small modular reactors (“mini-reactors”), internationally managed nuclear fuel services, and increasing reliance on the distributed (local) generation of electricity. After the disaster in Fukushima, there has been an understandable retreat from plans for large-scale reactors, with their inevitable safety issues. A vivid example of this reaction is found in Germany, which has cancelled its plans to increase the generation of electricity from nuclear reactors even though they are cleaner and more dependable than most other sources currently available. Vulnerabilities and inefficiencies of long-distance transmission lines point to a paradigm for generation and distribution of electric power that is more local – connected to national grids, to be sure, but able to operate independently of them. This is an ideal situation for mini-reactors, which are safer and less prone to encourage the spread of nuclear weapons. Internationally managed nuclear fuel services already exist and the security of supply can be assured by policies that foster more fuel service centers in Asia and elsewhere, including in the United States. These factors would enable suppliers of mini-reactors to expand their business to nations like North Korea and Iran under IAEA safeguards. The relevance of this energy paradigm to resolving the issues in North Korea and Iran is evident: both nations could develop civil nuclear programs with assured supplies of nuclear fuel from multiple internationally managed fuel service centers in Russia, China, and Western Europe while avoiding the ambiguity of nationally operated plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment. Reliance on distributed generation of electricity would be more efficient and less prone to blackouts. And the presence of a level playing field should be apparent from the fact that similar arrangements would be the 21st-century way of generating electricity from nuclear energy in the developed economies as well as in energy-starved economies such as India and China.

**Prolif is slow and unlikely- this assumes their tech spread warrants**

**Hymans ‘12** [Jacques E. C. Hymans, PhD from Harvard, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, his most recent book is Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation, “Botching the Bomb: Why Nuclear Weapons Programs Often Fail on Their Own-and Why Iran's Might, Too,” Foreign Affairs91. 3 (May/Jun 2012): 44-53, Proquest]

The great proliferation slowdown can be attributed in part to U.S. and international nonproliferation efforts. But it is mostly the result of the dysfunctional management tendencies of the states that have sought the bomb in recent decades. Weak institutions in those states have permitted political leaders to unintentionally undermine the performance of their nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians. The harder politicians have pushed to achieve their nuclear ambitions, the less productive their nuclear programs have become. Meanwhile, military attacks by foreign powers have tended to unite politicians and scientists in a common cause to build the bomb. Therefore, taking radical steps to rein in Iran would be not only risky but also potentially counterproductive, and much less likely to succeed than the simplest policy of all: getting out of the way and allowing the Iranian nuclear program's worst enemies-Iran's political leaders-to hinder the country's nuclear progress all by themselves. Nuclear dogs that have not barked "Today, almost any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years," a former chief of Israeli military intelligence recently wrote in The New York Times, echoing a widely held belief. Indeed, the more nuclear technology and know-how have diffused around the world, the more the timeline for building a bomb should have shrunk. But in fact, rather than speeding up over the past four decades, proliferation has gone into slow motion. Seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects before 1970, and all seven succeeded in relatively short order. By contrast, of the ten countries that have launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects since 1970, only three have achieved a bomb. And only one of the six states that failed-Iraq-had made much progress toward its ultimate goal by the time it gave up trying. (The jury is still out on Iran's program.) What is more, even the successful projects of recent decades have needed a long time to achieve their ends. The average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched before 1970 was about seven years; the average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched after 1970 has been about 17 years. International security experts have been unable to convincingly explain this remarkable trend. The first and most credible conventional explanation is that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt) has prevented a cascade of new nuclear weapons states by creating a system of export controls, technology safeguards, and on-site inspections of nuclear facilities. The npt regime has certainly closed off the most straightforward pathways to the bomb. However, the npt became a formidable obstacle to would-be nuclear states only in the 1990s, when its export-control lists were expanded and Western states finally became serious about enforcing them and when international inspectors started acting less like tourists and more like detectives. Yet the proliferation slowdown started at least 20 years before the system was solidified. So the npt, useful though it may be, cannot alone account for this phenomenon. A second conventional explanation is that although the NPT regime may not have been very effective, American and Israeli bombs have been. Syria's nascent nuclear effort, for instance, was apparently dealt a major setback by an Israeli air raid on its secret reactor construction site in 2007. But the record of military strikes is mixed. Contrary to the popular myth of the success of Israel's 1981 bombing of the Osiraq reactor in Iraq, the strike actually spurred Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to move beyond vague intentions and commit strongly to a dedicated nuclear weapons project, which lasted until the 1990-91 Gulf War. Moreover, the bombs that the United States dropped on Iraq during that conflict mostly missed Saddam's nuclear sites. Finally, some analysts have asserted that nuclear weapons projects become inefficient due to political leaders' flagging levels of commitment. But these analysts are reversing cause and effect: leaders lose interest when their nuclear programs are not running well. And some nuclear weapons projects, such as France's, have performed well despite very tepid support from above. The imperfect correlation between the commitment of leaders and the quality of nuclear programs should not be surprising, for although commentators may speak casually of "Mao's bomb" or "Kim Jong Il's bomb," the real work has to be carried out by other people.

# 2ac elections

**Romney’s all talk---he’d work with Russia**

Gasyuk 12 (Gasyuk, Rossiyskaya Gazeta’s Washington D.C. correspondent, 6-13, “Romney keeps the gloves off”, http://rbth.ru/articles/2012/06/13/romney\_keeps\_the\_gloves\_off\_15854.html)

Given the sharp disagreements between the United States and Russia on Syria, which is now careening toward civil war, Republicans will harshly criticize every attempt by Obama to further emphasize any progress in bilateral relations. “Some realism regarding U.S.-Russia relations would be constructive for the White House if it wants to avoid Republican attacks,” Simes told Russia Now. But this doesn’t mean that presumptive GOP nominee Mitt Romney, if elected, will transform his public anti-Russian statements into political practice. “I believe that most likely Governor Romney believes in the statements he made, but that does not mean that in practice this rhetoric will be his guide for action,” Simes said. “Many statements from the GOP candidates including those on foreign affairs surely have to be taken in the context of the political and electoral reality in the U.S.,” Aron said. “It is not only possible, but highly probable,” that Mitt Romney’s views on Russia will evolve if he is elected, Simes said. American political history is rife with examples of strategic U-turns that begin the morning after the inauguration balls. When Dwight Eisenhower ran for president, his advisers—such as the famous John Foster Dulles—spoke of Harry Truman’s “cowardly” policy of containment of the Soviet Union and called for the speedy liberation of Eastern Europe. However President Eisenhower instead started the process of normalizing relations through personal meetings with Nikita Khrushchev in 1955 and 1959. President Richard Nixon was viewed as a leading anti-Communist, but it was Nixon who found the way toward detente. Nixon made the first-ever trip by an American president to then-Communist Russia in 1972, but also opened the door to dialogue with Communist China. No one should be too surprised that Mitt Romney, if elected, might rethink his position. When needed for supply routes, Russia is no longer America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” As a president, many observers believe he would take a more realistic approach to handling bilateral ties.

**No impact**

Ostapenko 9---Trend Daily News staff writer (E., 7/7, “Normalization In U.s.-russian Relations Not To Change Political Situation In World: Analyst At French Studies Institute”, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/83734/-normalization-in-u-s-russian-relations-not-to-change-political-situation-in-world-analyst-at-french-studies-institute-.html)

Normalization of relations between the United States and Russia will not assume a global significance and will not change the situation in the world, since today Russia does not play the role it played formerly, Dominic Moisi, analyst on Russian-American relations, said. "There is a country that is essential for the future of the world, it is not Russia, but it is China," Moisi, founder and senior advisor at the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI), told Trend News in a telephone conversation from Paris

Speaking of the growing role of China, Moisi said that the Chinese are soon going to be the number two economy in the world. Russian economy can not compete. As another important aspect of the increasing weight of China in the world, Moisi considers the absence of problems with the aging of population, unlike European countries, including Russia.

**DOE is funding SMRs now and Obama’s taking credit -**

**Romney winning now – most qualified models.**

Caughey and Kelly 10-4. [Peter, David, CU-Boulder media relations, "Updated election forecasting model still points to Romney win, University of Colorado study says" University of Colorado Boulder Press Release -- www.colorado.edu/news/releases/2012/10/04/updated-election-forecasting-model-still-points-romney-win-university]

An update to an election forecasting model announced by two University of Colorado professors in August continues to project that Mitt Romney will win the 2012 presidential election.¶ According to their updated analysis, Romney is projected to receive 330 of the total 538 Electoral College votes. President Barack Obama is expected to receive 208 votes -- down five votes from their initial prediction -- and short of the 270 needed to win.¶ The new forecast by political science professors Kenneth Bickers of CU-Boulder and Michael Berry of CU Denver is based on more recent economic data than their original Aug. 22 prediction. The model itself did not change.¶ “We continue to show that the economic conditions favor Romney even though many polls show the president in the lead,” Bickers said. “Other published models point to the same result, but they looked at the national popular vote, while we stress state-level economic data.”¶ While many election forecast models are based on the popular vote, the model developed by Bickers and Berry is based on the Electoral College and is the only one of its type to include more than one state-level measure of economic conditions. They included economic data from all 50 states and the District of Columbia.¶ Their original prediction model was one of 13 published in August in PS: Political Science & Politics, a peer-reviewed journal of the American Political Science Association. The journal has published collections of presidential election models every four years since 1996, but this year the models showed the widest split in outcomes, Berry said. Five predicted an Obama win, five forecast a Romney win, and three rated the 2012 race as a toss-up.¶ The Bickers and Berry model includes both state and national unemployment figures as well as changes in real per capita income, among other factors. The new analysis includes unemployment rates from August rather than May, and changes in per capita income from the end of June rather than March. It is the last update they will release before the election.¶ Of the 13 battleground states identified in the model, the only one to change in the update was New Mexico -- now seen as a narrow victory for Romney. The model foresees Romney carrying New Mexico, North Carolina, Virginia, Iowa, New Hampshire, Colorado, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Florida. Obama is predicted to win Michigan and Nevada.¶ In Colorado, which Obama won in 2008, the model predicts that Romney will receive 53.3 percent of the vote to Obama’s 46.7 percent, with only the two major parties considered.¶ While national polls continue to show the president in the lead, “the president seems to be reaching a ceiling at or below 50 percent in many of these states,” Bickers said. “Polls typically tighten up in October as people start paying attention and there are fewer undecided voters.”¶ The state-by-state economic data used in their model have been available since 1980. When these data were applied retroactively to each election year, the model correctly classifies all presidential election winners, including the two years when independent candidates ran strongly: 1980 and 1992. It also correctly estimates the outcome in 2000, when Al Gore won the popular vote but George W. Bush won the election through the Electoral College.

**Euro crisis and Iran doom Obama**

**Hulsman 12**, John, President and Co-Founder of John C. Hulsman Enterprises [“Obama’s foreign policy black swans,” 5/6, http://www.aspeninstitute.it/aspenia-online/article/obama%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy-black-swans

And here almost all the news is bad, only having the potential to make things worse for the President. As such, the White House wants the next few months to fly by, with nothing much happening. But two foreign policy black swans have now glided clearly into view, either of which could decisively doom the Obama campaign. Worse, the President’s team has almost no control over either of them and is instead at their mercy. Europe hits the iceberg According to sources inside the Obama campaign, Europe can just about muddle through the next few months, but only if everything goes right. To put it mildly, given the European elite’s dreadful policy track record and glacial pace at dealing with the euro crisis, it would seem the Obama team is prizing hope over experience; the whole festering mess could so easily turn septic. If the European recession becomes a depression, if the partial collapse of the euro becomes another Lehman moment, even a partially shielded America will be knocked enough off course - given its own weak economic recovery to begin with. This would doom Obama to a single term. Behind it all, there is undoubted donor fatigue as well as colony fatigue in Europe. Far from deepening ties amongst European nations, the euro crisis has strained relations in a way not seen over the post-war era. Germans (and I live there and hear this every day) are tired of supplying the credit card for others’ parties and lack of fiscal rigor; they don’t want to pay for Greeks who retire in their 50s (Germans continue plodding along in work until they are 67), many of whom don’t pay their taxes. In return, southern European states don’t want to be arrogantly told what to do by a Berlin who seems as inflexible about austerity uber alles as it is oblivious to the real sufferings of the people. There is no doubt the debtor states borrowed too much. However there is also no doubt that German and French banks lent them too much. In other words, there are plenty of villains here beyond Germany’s comforting and simplistic narrative of events. Because of past mishandlings, the euro crisis is now like dealing with an unexploded bomb; one wrong move and the whole thing could blow sky high. The latest June 1 poll puts hard left Syriza ahead in the Greek election. Were this rejectionist party (regarding the bailouts) to win and form a government, their fairy tale of a substantial bailout renegotiation with the Germans would within days be exposed for the fantasy it is. Greece would rather quickly be booted from the currency. Far more important Spain - struggling with 10-year bond yields at an almost unsustainable 6.7% - could well be forced to ask for a bailout in the near term, as its bad banking debt runs to at least 180 billion euros. If Spain, the fourth largest economy in the eurozone, is forced to go cap in hand to the EU (ie the Germans) the euro project itself will be called into existential question. The thing hangs by a thread, and there is precious little Obama or an ineffective Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner (he always looks as if he’s stifling a scream when he leaves European meetings, making him less than popular) can do. Iran may well come to a head As if this were not enough (and contrary to conventional pundit wisdom at present), an Isreali strike on Iran’s nuclear sites in September cannot be ruled out. Knowing that Obama could, once re-elected, afford to be far tougher with his government over this issue - demanding that the sanctions approach be given real time - Prime Minister Netanyahu must be tempted to strike in the Autumn, ahead of the American election, while he still has the military ability to do so. At present, Israel worries with reason that the Fordo reprocessing plant (buried more than 290 feet below a mountain outside the holy city of Qom) may soon be impregnable to Israeli bunker busters. At which point Israel would have to count on the United States (with its superior munitions) to act in its place. But it is not part of Israel’s strategic culture to subcontract its existential survival out to any other country, even an ally like America. Worse, from the Israeli point of view, despite all the kind words the US and Israel have for one another, their objectives fundamentally diverge over Iran. For Obama the red line is Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, for Netanyahu it is Tehran having the capacity to produce nuclear weapons; there is a canyon between these two positions. Since the two famously do not get along (Netanyahu much prefers Romney, who has made almost-unquestioned support for Israel a major plank of his putative foreign policy), the Israeli Prime Minister will not shed tears if his actions cause Obama’s defeat in November. From his perspective that would just amount to an added bonus. For there is little doubt that this second foreign policy black swan could also easily derail the President’s plans. Triggered by the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a spike in oil prices and the global economic uncertainty unleashed by such an attack would almost inevitably push a very fragile Western world toward calamity. Without question, enough economic damage would be done to put paid to the White House’s chance for a second term.

**Silver’s long term polls aren’t accurate**

Dickinson ‘10 – Professor of Political Science Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College and taught previously at Harvard University where he worked under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt. “Nate Silver Is Not A Political Scientist”. November 1, 2010

I’ve made this point before, most recently during the 2008 presidential campaign when Silver’s forecast model, with its rapidly changing “win” probabilities, made it appear as if voters were altering their preferences on a weekly basis. This was nonsense, of course, which is why the political science forecast models issued around Labor Day proved generally accurate. But in light of Silver’s column yesterday, it bears repeating: he’s not a political scientist. He’s an economist by training, but he’s really a weathercaster when it comes to predicting political outcomes. That is, he’s very adept at doing the equivalent of climbing to the top of Mt. Worth (a local skiing area for those not familiar with God’s Green Mountains), looking west toward Lake Champlain to see what the prevailing winds are carrying toward us, and issuing a weather bulletin for tomorrow. Mind you, this isn’t necessarily a knock on Silver’s work – he’s a damn good weathercaster. In 2008, his day—before election estimate came pretty close to nailing the Electoral College vote. More generally, at his best, he digs up intriguing data or uncovers interesting political patterns. At the same time, however, when it comes to his forecast models, he’s susceptible to the “Look Ma! No Hands!” approach in which he suggests the more numerous the variables in his model, the more effective it must be. In truth, as Sam Wang demonstrated in 2008, when his much simpler forecast model proved more accurate than Silver’s, parsimony can be a virtue when it comes to predictions. Why do I bring this up now? Because, in the face of conflicting data, weathercasters can become unstrung if they are used to simply reporting the weather without possessing much of a grasp of basic meteorology. In yesterday’s column which the more cynical among us (who, moi?) might interpret as a classic CYA move, Silver raises a number of reasons why current forecasts (read: his!) might prove hopelessly wrong. Now, I applaud all efforts to specify the confidence interval surrounding a forecast. But the lack of logic underling Silver’s presentation reveals just how little theory goes into his predictions. For instance, he suggests the incumbent rule – which he has spent two years debunking – might actually come into play tomorrow. (The incumbent rule says, in effect, that in close races, almost all undecideds break for the challenger). Silver has provided data suggesting this rule didn’t apply in 2006 or 2008. You would think, therefore, that he doesn’t believe in the incumbent rule. Not so! He writes, “So, to cite the incumbent rule as a point of fact as wrong. As a theory, however — particularly one that applies to this election and not necessarily to others — perhaps it will turn out to have some legs.” Excuse me? Why, if there’s no factual basis for the incumbent rule, will it turn out to apply in this election? The rest of the column rests on equally sketchy reasoning. Silver concludes by writing, “What we know, however, is that polls can sometimes miss pretty badly in either direction. Often, this is attributed to voters having made up (or changed) their minds at the last minute — but it’s more likely that the polls were wrong all along. These are some reasons they could be wrong in a way that underestimates how well Republicans will do. There are also, of course, a lot of reasons they could be underestimating Democrats; we’ll cover these in a separate piece.” Let me get this straight: it’s possible the polls are underestimating the Republican support. Or, they might be underestimating Democrats’ support. I think this means if his forecast model proves incorrect, it’s because the polls “were wrong all along”. Really? Might it instead have something to do with his model? Come on Silver – man up! As it is, you already take the easy way out by issuing a forecast a day before the election, in contrast to the political scientists who put their reputations on the line by Labor Day. Do you believe in your model or not? The bottom line: if you want to know tomorrow’s weather, a weathercaster is good enough. If you want to know what causes the weather, you might want to look elsewhere.

**intrinsicness**

**no link – GoP won’t politicize the plan**

Davenport ’12 (Coral Davenport is the energy and environment correspondent for National Journal. Prior to joining National Journal in 2010, Davenport covered energy and environment for Politico, and before that, for Congressional Quarterly, “Pentagon's Clean-Energy Initiatives Could Help Troops—and President Obama”, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/pentagon-s-clean-energy-initiatives-could-help-troops-and-president-obama-20120411?mrefid=site_search>, April 11, 2012, LEQ)

The Pentagon plans to roll out a new slate of clean- and renewable-energy initiatives on Wednesday as part of its long-term “Operational Energy Strategy” aimed at reducing the military’s dependence on fossil fuels while increasing its front-line fighting power. The moves are in keeping with a sustained push by the military in recent years to cut its dependence on oil, which costs the Pentagon up to $20 billion annually and has led to the deaths of thousands of troops and contractors, killed while guarding fuel convoys in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some renewable-energy projects at the Defense Department are already paying big dividends. Pentagon efforts to research and deploy products like hybrid batteries for tanks have enabled combat vehicles to travel farther without refueling, while advances in portable solar generation have allowed troops on the front lines in Afghanistan to power housing and electronic facilities without requiring fuel convoys to make dangerous drives through hostile territory to deliver the diesel required for traditional generators. It doesn’t hurt that the initiatives also tie in politically with President Obama’s unwavering support for clean energy on the campaign trail—even as Republicans continue to attack him almost daily on energy issues. GOP and conservative “super PACs” have no problem hitting Obama for his support of renewable-energy programs in the wake of the bankruptcy of Solyndra, the solar panel company that cost the federal government $535 million in loan guarantees from the economic stimulus law. But politically, it’s a lot harder for traditionally hawkish Republicans to criticize the Pentagon’s embrace of renewable power, which Defense officials have repeatedly made clear is not being done in the interest of an environmental agenda, but rather to increase security and fighting capability on the front lines. Defense officials have also emphasized that much of the funding for the Pentagon’s renewable-energy initiatives won’t come from taxpayer dollars. On Tuesday, a Defense official said that the construction of renewable-electricity plants for Army and Air Force bases–which the official said could cost up to $7 billion—will be privately financed.

**Nuclear power popular**

Brown ’12 (Dave Brown — Exclusive to Uranium Investing News, “United States Still Favors Nuclear Power”, <http://uraniuminvestingnews.com/11008/united-states-still-favors-nuclear-power.html>, March 28, 2012, LEQ)

According to the results of Gallup’s annual Environment survey, conducted earlier this month, the majority of Americans continue to favor nuclear energy as a source of electricity for the United States. The survey indicated that 57 percent of participants were in favor of nuclear power this year, the same amount as in 1994, the first year for the survey. This year’s results also demonstrate an equal level of support among participants as last year, just prior to the Japanese earthquake and tsunami. Support for the nuclear industry as measured by the survey has ranged from a low of 46 percent in 2001 to a high of 62 percent in 2010. These results are of significance to investors as the US is the largest consumer of uranium in the world, with 104 operational nuclear reactors. Continued public support and confidence from the country should guide future political decisions and foster economic interest in domestic and international uranium resources as well as in nuclear industry stakeholders.

**econ outweighs the plan**

Pew 12. [Pew Research Center, “GOP Holds early turnout edge, but little enthusiasm for Romney” June 21 -- http://www.people-press.org/2012/06/21/section-2-assessing-obama-and-romneys-support/]

Economy Dominates Voter Concerns¶ Economic conditions are at the forefront of most voters’ concerns. When asked to name the issue they would most like to hear the candidates talk about, 56% mention one of three economic topics: the economy broadly (42%), the job situation (13%) or the budget deficit (4%). Health care is the only other issue garnering more than one-in-ten mentions (18%).¶ A separate close-ended question echoes these economic concerns. When offered six choices, a plurality of voters (35%) say that jobs will be the top issue in deciding their vote for president this year, followed by the budget deficit (23%) and health care (19%). Another 11% say Social Security will matter most to them, with relatively few citing immigration (5%) or gay marriage (4%) as the most important issue affecting their vote.¶ Jobs top the list for both certain Obama supporters (37%) and swing voters (38%), while certain Romney supporters are about equally likely to say jobs (30%) as to say the budget deficit (33%). Health care is more frequently named by certain Obama voters (26%) than either certain Romney (14%) or swing voters (15%).

**Winners win**

**Halloran 10,** Liz Halloran is a Washington correspondent for NPR “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made,” NPR April 6

Amazing what a win in a major legislative battle will do for a president's spirit. (Turmoil over spending and leadership at the Republican National Committee over the past week, and the release Tuesday of a major new and largely sympathetic book about the president by New Yorker editor David Remnick, also haven't hurt White House efforts to drive its own, new narrative.) Though the president's national job approval ratings failed to get a boost by the passage of the health care overhaul — his numbers have remained steady this year at just under 50 percent — he has earned grudging respect even from those who don't agree with his policies. "He's achieved something that virtually everyone in Washington thought he couldn't," says Henry Olsen, vice president and director of the business-oriented American Enterprise Institute's National Research Initiative. "And that's given him confidence." The protracted health care battle looks to have taught the White House something about power, says presidential historian Gil Troy — a lesson that will inform Obama's pursuit of his initiatives going forward. "I think that Obama realizes that presidential power is a muscle, and the more you exercise it, the stronger it gets," Troy says. "He exercised that power and had a success with health care passage, and now he wants to make sure people realize it's not just a blip on the map." The White House now has an opportunity, he says, to change the narrative that had been looming — that the Democrats would lose big in the fall midterm elections, and that Obama was looking more like one-term President Jimmy Carter than two-termer Ronald Reagan, who also managed a difficult first-term legislative win and survived his party's bad showing in the midterms. Approval Ratings Obama is exuding confidence since the health care bill passed, but his approval ratings as of April 1 remain unchanged from the beginning of the year, according to Pollster.com. What's more, just as many people disapprove of Obama's health care policy now as did so at the beginning of the year. According to the most recent numbers: Forty-eight percent of all Americans approve of Obama, and 47 disapprove. Fifty-two percent disapprove of Obama's health care policy, compared with 43 percent who approve. Stepping Back From A Precipice Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style." "You've got to be impressed with an achievement like that," Olsen says. But Olsen is among those who argue that, long-term, Obama and his party would have been better served politically by an incremental approach to reworking the nation's health care system, something that may have been more palatable to independent voters Democrats will need in the fall. "He would have been able to show he was listening more, that he heard their concerns about the size and scope of this," Olsen says. Muscling out a win on a sweeping health care package may have invigorated the president and provided evidence of leadership, but, his critics say, it remains to be seen whether Obama and his party can reverse what the polls now suggest is a losing issue for them. Golden Boy Tested One of the questions that has trailed Obama is how he would deal with criticism and the prospect of failure, says Troy, a McGill University history professor and visiting scholar affiliated with the bipartisan Policy Center in Washington. "He is one of those golden boys who never failed in his life, and people like that are often not used to criticism and failure," Troy says. Obama and his campaign were temporarily knocked for a loop early in the 2008 presidential campaign by then-GOP vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin's "zingers," Troy says, "and Obama was thrown off balance again by the loss of the Massachusetts Senate seat." The arc of the health care debate reminded observers that Obama is not just a product of Harvard, but also of tough Chicago politics, Troy says. "You don't travel as far and as fast as Barack Obama without having a spine of steel," he says. "He has an ability to regenerate, to come back, and knows that there is no such thing as a dirty win: a win is a win" — even if it infuriates the progressive wing of the president's party, which wanted far more sweeping changes to the nation's health care system. GOP Stumbles Obama's new mojo has been abetted, in a way, by high-profile troubles at the Republican National Committee. RNC Chairman Michael Steele has been under fire over the past week for his spending on private jets and limousines, and a staffer resigned after submitting to the committee a nearly $2,000 tab for a visit by young party members to a risque Los Angeles nightclub. The disarray intensified Monday with the resignation of the committee's chief of staff, and growing anger among top GOP strategists and fundraisers. "Steele has kept Republicans off-message," says West, of Brookings. "Every story about RNC spending is one less story about their views on health care at a time when news coverage has shifted in a more favorable direction." The distraction continued Monday when detractors accused Steele of playing the race card after he told ABC News that as an African American, he, like Obama, is being held to a higher standard. White House Spokesman Robert Gibbs, when asked about Steele's assertion, said the RNC chairman's problem "isn't the race card, it's the credit card." The controversy, Olsen says, hasn't been good for the Republicans' preparations for elections in terms of money and organization. But he doesn't view it as "a voter issue." How Win Translates When Reagan won his tough legislative battle in the early 1980s, it was over tax cuts, something voters saw as directly related to the then-dismal economy. Obama has long made a case for health care reform as a big piece of economic reform, but it's a difficult argument to make to voters, Olsen says, particularly when many of the health care law's major provisions don't go into effect for another four years. But observers like Troy say they believe that though initially unrelated, a boost in employment among Americans would encourage voters to look more favorably on the health care overhauls. "The perceived success of health care legislation rides on job creation," Troy says. Economists have recently declared the nation's recession, which began in 2007, over. But the unemployment rate has remained stubbornly at just under 10 percent. "I think he understands he's in a crucial period of his presidency," Olsen says. "He's taken a lot of risks, and there's not immediate rewards." Obama faces continuing tests on other big domestic issues, including Wall Street reform, the economy and climate change, as well as myriad foreign policy challenges ranging from testy relations with Israel and uncertainties about Iran's nuclear capabilities, to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Late last month, the administration and Russia agreed to a new nuclear arms treaty that is expected to be signed Thursday in advance of an international summit in Washington. The world is waiting, Troy says, to see how the president's renewed confidence plays out on the international stage. But the newly invigorated president continues to encourage voters to wait and see what his efforts produce.

**Obama legalizes pot as an October surprise**

Mark **Whittington**, 6-14-**2012**, writer and computer analyst residing in Houston Obama’s October Surprise Could Be Legalizing Pot, Yahoo! News, p. http://news.yahoo.com/obamas-october-surprise-could-legalizing-pot-191100768.html, accessed 9-10-2012

The Atlantic Wire believes that it has hit upon President Obama's surefire October Surprise to change his political fortunes andget him re-electedfor a second term. That October surprise would be for him to support the legalization of pot. This last-minute gambit has an advantage to starting a war, being that no one would get killed. The theory is that young voters,disenchanted with Obama because of the fact they are still living in their parents' garage three years after graduation and can't get a job, will be motivated to turn out for him because he supports legalized dope smoking. The Washington Post related David Maraniss' claims of Barack Obama being a pothead during his high school days. The gambit would also answer Penn Jillette's recent rant on the hypocrisy of Obama, a self-admitted former doper, enforcing drug laws that put people like he used to be in jail. The idea that Obama can get potheads motivated enough to turn off "The Daily Show," get off the couch, and go to the polls is a very charming one. To be sure, people voting while stoned could explain a lot of election results -- the re-election of Jerry Brown as governor of California comes to mind. But the legalized pot gambit has some pitfalls. Millions of people, likely more than who toke while laughing hysterically at Bill Maher, are against legalized drug use. Rasmussen suggested that a plurality of 47 percent of Americans favor legalizing marijuana and taxing it, which makes the say yes to drugs gambit just a little tempting to a president facing defeat in November. But such a move could be turned back on Obama fairly quickly. Mitt Romney, whose skill at the political riposte has become well known, would have lots of fun with an Obama legalize dope initiative. What next, he will ask. Selling crystal meth to school kids from vending machines? And if Obama proposed taxing pot at the same time, Romney would think that the good lord really does want him to be president. The conservative base likes few things less, besides gays getting married, than legalized dope and raising taxes, even on legalized dope. What, Obama would ask, does this have to do with a bad economy? One hope would be left for Obama: a stimulus package for pot growers. It may be his only hope.

**SMRs solve inevitable water wars**

**Palley ’11** Reese Palley, The London School of Economics, 2011, The Answer: Why Only Inherently Safe, Mini Nuclear Power Plans Can Save Our World, p. 168-71

The third world has long been rent in recent droughts, by the search for water. In subsistence economies, on marginal land, water is not a convenience but a matter of life and death. As a result small **wars have been fought, rivers diverted, and wells poisoned in what could be a warning of what is to come as industrialized nations begin to face failing water supplies.** Quite aside from the demand for potable water is the dependence of enormous swaths of industry and agriculture on oceans of water used for processing, enabling, and cleaning a thousand processes and products. It is interesting to note that fresh water used in both industry and agriculture is reduced to a nonrenewable resource as agriculture adds salt and industry adds a chemical brew unsuitable for consumption. More than one billion people in the world already lack access to clean water, and things are getting worse. Over the next two decades, the average supply of water per person will drop by a third, **condemning millions** of people **to** waterborne **diseases** and an avoidable premature death.81 So **the stage is set for water access wars between** the **first and the third worlds**, between **neighbors** downstream of supply, between **big industry** and big agriculture, between **nations**, between **population** centers, and ultimately between you and the people who live next door for an already inadequate world water supply that is not being renewed. **As populations inevitably increase, conflicts will intensify**.82 It is only by virtue of the historical accident of the availability of nuclear energy that humankind now has the ability to remove the salt and other pollutants to supply all our water needs. The problem is that **desalination is an intensely local process**. Some localities have available sufficient water from renewable sources to take care of their own needs, but not enough to share with their neighbors, and it **is here that the scale of nuclear energy production must be defined locally.** Large scale 1,000 MWe plants can be used to desalinate water as well as for generating electricity However we cannot build them fast enough to address the problem, and, if built they would face the extremely expensive problem of distributing the water they produce. Better, much better, would be to use small desalinization plants sited locally. Beyond desalination for human use is the need to green some of the increasing desertification of vast areas such as the Sahara. Placing twenty 100 MWe plants a hundred miles apart along the Saharan coast would green the coastal area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, a task accomplished more cheaply and quickly than through the use of gigawatt plants.83 This could proceed on multiple tracks wherever deserts are available to be reclaimed. Leonard Orenstein, a researcher in the field of desert reclamation, speculates: If most of the Sahara and Australian outback were planted with fast-growing trees like eucalyptus, the forests could draw down about 8 billion tons of carbon a year—nearly as much as people emit from burning fossil fuels today. As the forests matured, they could continue taking up this much carbon for decades.84 **The use of small, easily transported**, easily **sited**, and walk away **safe nuclear reactors dedicated to desalination is the only answer** to the disproportionate distribution of water resources that have distorted human habitation patterns for millennia. Where there existed natural water, such as from rivers, great cities arose and civilizations flourished. Other localities lay barren through the ages. We now have the power, by means of SMRs profiled to local conditions, not only to attend to existing water shortages but also to smooth out disproportionate water distribution and create green habitation where historically it has never existed. **The endless wars that have been fought**, first over solid bullion gold and then over oily black gold, **can now engulf us in the desperate reach for liquid blue gold. We need never fight these wars again as we now have the nuclear power to fulfill the** biblical **ability to “strike any local rock and have water gush forth**.”

**That solves indo-pak water wars that go nuclear.**

**Zahoor ‘11** (Musharaf, is researcher at Department of Nuclear Politics, National Defence University, Islamabad, “Water crisis can trigger nuclear war in South Asia,” <http://www.siasat.pk/forum/showthread.php?77008-Water-Crisis-can-Trigger-Nuclear-War-in-South-Asia>, AM)

South Asia is among one of those regions where water needs are growing disproportionately to its availability. The high increase in population besides large-scale cultivation has turned South Asia into a water scarce region. The two nuclear neighbors Pakistan and India share the waters of Indus Basin. All the major rivers stem from the Himalyan region and pass through Kashmir down to the planes of Punjab and Sindh empty into Arabic ocean. It is pertinent that the strategic importance of Kashmir, a source of all major rivers, for Pakistan and symbolic importance of Kashmir for India are maximum list positions. Both the countries have fought two major wars in 1948, 1965 and a limited war in Kargil specifically on the Kashmir dispute. Among other issues, the newly born states fell into water sharing dispute right after their partition. Initially under an agreed formula, Pakistan paid for the river waters to India, which is an upper riparian state. After a decade long negotiations, both the states signed Indus Water Treaty in 1960. Under the treaty, India was given an exclusive right of three eastern rivers Sutlej, Bias and Ravi while Pakistan was given the right of three Western Rivers, Indus, Chenab and Jhelum. The tributaries of these rivers are also considered their part under the treaty. It was assumed that the treaty had permanently resolved the water issue, which proved a nightmare in the latter course. India by exploiting the provisions of IWT started wanton construction of dams on Pakistani rivers thus scaling down the water availability to Pakistan (a lower riparian state). The treaty only allows run of the river hydropower projects and does not permit to construct such water reservoirs on Pakistani rivers, which may affect the water flow to the low lying areas. According to the statistics of Hydel power Development Corporation of Indian Occupied Kashmir, India has a plan to construct 310 small, medium and large dams in the territory. India has already started work on 62 dams in the first phase. The cumulative dead and live storage of these dams will be so great that India can easily manipulate the water of Pakistani rivers. India has set up a department called the Chenab Valley Power Projects to construct power plants on the Chenab River in occupied Kashmir. India is also constructing three major hydro-power projects on Indus River which include Nimoo Bazgo power project, Dumkhar project and Chutak project. On the other hand, it has started Kishan Ganga hydropower project by diverting the waters of Neelum River, a tributary of the Jhelum, in sheer violation of the IWT. The gratuitous construction of dams by India has created serious water shortages in Pakistan. The construction of Kishan Ganga dam will turn the Neelum valley, which is located in Azad Kashmir into a barren land. The water shortage will not only affect the cultivation but it has serious social, political and economic ramifications for Pakistan. The farmer associations have already started protests in Southern Punjab and Sindh against the non-availability of water. These protests are so far limited and under control. The reports of international organizations suggest that the water availability in Pakistan will reduce further in the coming years. If the situation remains unchanged, the violent mobs of villagers across the country will be a major law and order challenge for the government. The water shortage has also created mistrust among the federative units, which is evident from the fact that the President and the Prime Minister had to intervene for convincing Sindh and Punjab provinces on water sharing formula. The Indus River System Authority (IRSA) is responsible for distribution of water among the provinces but in the current situation it has also lost its credibility. The provinces often accuse each other of water theft. In the given circumstances, Pakistan desperately wants to talk on water issue with India. The meetings between Indus Water Commissioners of Pakistan and India have so far yielded no tangible results. The recent meeting in Lahore has also ended without concrete results. India is continuously using delaying tactics to under pressure Pakistan. The Indus Water Commissioners are supposed to resolve the issues bilaterally through talks. The success of their meetings can be measured from the fact that Pakistan has to knock at international court of arbitration for the settlement of Kishan Ganga hydropower project. The recently held foreign minister level talks between both the countries ended inconclusively in Islamabad, which only resulted in heightening the mistrust and suspicions. The water stress in Pakistan is increasing day by day. The construction of dams will not only cause damage to the agriculture sector but India can manipulate the river water to create inundations in Pakistan. The rivers in Pakistan are also vital for defense during wartime. The control over the water will provide an edge to India during war with Pakistan. The failure of diplomacy, manipulation of IWT provisions by India and growing water scarcity in Pakistan and its social, political and economic repercussions for the country can lead both the countries toward a war. The existent A-symmetry between the conventional forces of both the countries will compel the weaker side to use nuclear weapons to prevent the opponent from taking any advantage of the situation. Pakistan's nuclear programme is aimed at to create minimum credible deterrence. India has a declared nuclear doctrine which intends to retaliate massively in case of first strike by its' enemy. In 2003, India expanded the operational parameters for its nuclear doctrine. Under the new parameters, it will not only use nuclear weapons against a nuclear strike but will also use nuclear weapons against a nuclear strike on Indian forces anywhere. Pakistan has a draft nuclear doctrine, which consists on the statements of high ups. Describing the nuclear thresh-hold in January 2002, General Khalid Kidwai, the head of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, in an interview to Landau Network, said that Pakistan will use nuclear weapons in case India occupies large parts of its territory, economic strangling by India, political disruption and if India destroys Pakistan's forces. The analysis of the ambitious nuclear doctrines of both the countries clearly points out that any military confrontation in the region can result in a nuclear catastrophe. The rivers flowing from Kashmir are Pakistan's lifeline, which are essential for the livelihood of 170 million people of the country and the cohesion of federative units. The failure of dialogue will leave no option but to achieve the ends through military means.

**Sats key to disease monitoring**

**Harmon ‘9** (Katherine, News Reporter @ Scientific American “Satellites Used to Predict Infectious Disease Outbreaks” 8/24, <http://www.scientificamerican.com/author.cfm?id=1822>)

Rather than searching for weird weather or enemy missiles, some satellites are helping researchers to track—and predict—the spread of deadly diseases. With the pandemic spread of H1N1 swine fluand the continued advance of the H5N1 avian flu, scientists are anxious to better predict the spread of infectious diseases and are looking for new tools wherever they might be—even if that's hundreds of miles in the sky. "Ideally we could predict conditions that would result in some of these major outbreaks of cholera, malaria, even avian flu," says Tim Ford of the University of New England in Biddeford, Maine. Ford and a group of experts have co-authored a perspective paper (pdf), due out next month in Emerging Infectious Diseases, that proposes making use of environmental data—tracked via satellite—to predict disease outbreaks. "As climate changes, and even with many of our weather patterns, [it] directly affects the distribution of disease," Ford says. Hantavirus, the pulmonary disease spread by rodents, for example, has been linked to changes in precipitation. With more rainfall, vegetation increases, which then fuels rodent populations. And pinpointing an area as relevant conditions emerge—before an outbreak starts—buys precious time to spread public health messages. Satellite imaging can also help warn of cholera outbreaks, which are predicted to worsen with climate change. The satellites provide information about water surface temperatures, which are key to the spread of this waterborne disease. One study found that giving people simple preventative instructions, such as filtering water through a sari cloth, reduced cholera-related deaths by an estimated 50 percent in some areas. Remote data have already been used to map the avian flu in Asia. Xiangming Xiao, associate director of the University of Oklahoma's Center for Spatial Analysis in Norman, has been tracking likely outbreaks of this highly pathogenic flu by looking for key habitat and weather changes. The domestic duck—determined to be the main carrier of the disease—is a common inhabitant of Southeast Asia's rice paddies, and the movement of migratory birds—a secondary carrier—could be predicted based on temperatures. So using both land-use and temperature information from satellites, Xiao and his team could track the spread of the flu by estimating where the birds would be. If visual data from satellites is combined with information from radar and LiDAR, (light detecting and ranging, which provides laser-measured data about 3-D contours), Xiao explains, researchers can really hone prediction of some diseases down to a tree line. "You can look at… the transition of pasture grassland to forests," he says, habitats which determine the range of deer. "And this has very important implications for tick-borne diseases, like Lyme disease." Much of the satellite work, however, still relies on clear skies. And all of it has been dependent on quality information from willing providers, such as NASA and its Earth Observing System, the availability of which researchers hope will continue in the future. Even with the clearest NASA images, though, current methods are far from perfect. They employ complex models and incomplete information, risking false alarms and missed outbreaks. The satellite data are still just a portion of the equation. They allow researchers to start "standing back and looking at the picture from a distance," Ford says. He and others are heavily reliant on ground-based measurements and observations. Xiao notes that, "the in situ observations are still very, very important. So the key is to combine those together—that's a real challenge." To make the predictions as precise as possible takes understanding the ecology not just of the place being studied, but also of the disease and the human population. "You see tremendous variations in different areas," says Ford of how diseases behave, and "in some sense, [that is due to] just difference in human behavior." Judging the severity of avian flu's spread from satellite imaging, for instance, requires knowing how likely certain areas are to keep domestic chickens and ducks—a practice more common in countries that consume more poultry, Xiao explains. And getting precise poultry production statistics can be a real challenge, he notes, as record-keeping can vary greatly among countries and regions. But Ford thinks that even with these limitations, "There's no reason at all we shouldn't be able to say, 'This summer is going to be a bad hantavirus year' or 'This season will likely have a high cholera risk.'" Novel or long-dormant diseases present more challenges for remote prediction. "Whether we can predict emerging diseases is a whole other question," Ford says, especially as their vectors or risk factors might take time to assess. And some diseases that spread among people might turn out to be nearly impossible to predict using satellite and environmental data beyond what researchers already know about seasonal cycles, like that for the seasonal flu. And, the nonseasonal H1N1 flu, for example, "is probably going to be more to do with human patterns [and] rapid transport between countries" than environmental changes that can be mapped, Ford says. Predicting infectious diseases is a crucial step in curbing them, Ford notes. "With all our medical advances and our advances in sanitation…we still have not been able to grapple with diseases," he says. But he is hopeful for the future of satellite-based prediction—even as it becomes a greater necessity in a changing climate and globalized world. "There's really nowhere on the globe that a pathogen can really remain isolated," he says.

**Extinction**

Yu ‘9 (Victoria, “Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate,” Dartmouth Journal of Undergraduate Science, May 22, <http://dujs.dartmouth.edu/spring-2009/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate>)

In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-14th century (7). While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, new viral strains are constantly emerging — a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction**.** Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential pandemic-causing virus.  It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system.  However, for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential. The simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift (point mutations that lead to new strains) and antigenic shift (the inter-species transfer of disease) in the influenza virus could produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).