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**Calleo 10**, Director – European Studies Program and Professor @ SAIS, (David P, “American Decline Revisited,” *Survival*, 52:4, 215 – 227)

The history of the past two decades suggests that adjusting to a plural world is not easy for the United States. As its economic strength is increasingly challenged by relative decline, it clings all the more to its peerless military prowess. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, that overwhelming military power, evolved over the Cold War, is less and less effective. In many respects, America's geopolitical imagination seems frozen in the posture of the Cold War. The lingering pretension to be the dominant power everywhere has encouraged the United States to hazard two unpromising land wars, plus a diffuse and interminable struggle against 'terrorism'. Paying for these wars and the pretensions behind them confirms the United States in a new version of Cold War finance. Once more, unmanageable fiscal problems poison the currency, an old pathology that firmly reinstates the nation on its path to decline. It was the hegemonic Cold War role, after all, that put the United States so out of balance with the rest of the world economy. In its hegemonic Cold War position, the United States found it necessary to run very large deficits and was able to finance them simply by creating and exporting more and more dollars. The consequence is today's restless mass of accumulated global money. Hence, whereas the value of all global financial assets in 1980 was just over 100% of global output, by 2008, even after the worst of the financial implosion, that figure had exploded to just under 300%.25 Much of this is no doubt tied up in the massive but relatively inert holdings of the Chinese and Japanese. But thanks to today's instantaneous electronic transfers, huge sums can be marshalled and deployed on very short notice. It is this excess of volatile money that arguably fuels the world's great recurring bubbles. It can create the semblance of vast real wealth for a time, but can also (with little notice) sow chaos in markets, wipe out savings and dry up credit for real investment. What constitutes a morbid overstretch in the American political economy thus ends up as a threat to the world economy in general. To lead itself and the world into a more secure future the United States must put aside its old, unmeasured geopolitical ambitions paid for by unlimited cheap credit. Instead, the United States needs a more balanced view of its role in history. But America's post-Soviet pundits have, unfortunately, proved more skilful at perpetuating outmoded dreams of past glory than at promoting the more modest visions appropriate to a plural future. One can always hope that newer generations of Americans will find it easier to adjust to pluralist reality. The last administration, however, was not very encouraging in this regard. III What about Barack Obama? So far, his economic policy has shown itself probably more intelligent and certainly more articulate than his predecessor's. His thinking is less hobbled by simple-minded doctrines. It accepts government's inescapable role in regulating markets and providing a durable framework for orderly governance and societal fellowship. To be sure, the Obama administration, following in the path of the Bush administration, has carried short-term counter-cyclical stimulation to a previously unimagined level. Perhaps so radical an expansion of credit is unavoidable under present circumstances. The administration is caught between the need to rebalance by scaling back and the fear that restraint applied now will trigger a severe depression. Obama's chief aide, Rahm Emanuel, is famous for observing: 'Rule one: Never allow a crisis to go to waste. They are opportunities to do big things.'26 So far, Obama's administration has made use of its crisis to promote an unprecedented expansion of welfare spending.27 Much of the spending is doubtless good in itself and certainly serves the administration's strong counter-cyclical purposes. But at some point the need to pass from expansion to stabilisation will presumably be inescapable. Budget cuts will have to be found somewhere, and demographic trends suggest that drastic reductions in civilian welfare spending are unlikely. Elementary prudence might suggest that today's financial crisis is an ideal occasion for America's long-overdue retreat from geopolitical overstretch, a time for bringing America's geopolitical pretensions into harmony with its diminishing foreign possibilities and expanding domestic needs. The opportunities for geopolitical saving appear significant. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), current military plans will require an average military budget of $652bn (in 2010 dollars) each year through 2028. The estimate optimistically assumes only 30,000 troops will be engaged abroad after 2013. As the CBO observes, these projections exceed the peak budgets of the Reagan administration's military build-up of the mid-1980s (about $500bn annually in 2010 dollars). This presumes a military budget consuming 3.5% of GDP through 2020.28 Comparable figures for other nations are troubling: 2.28% for the United Kingdom, 2.35% for France, 2.41% for Russia and 1.36% for China.29 Thus, while the financial crisis has certainly made Americans fear for their economic future, it does not yet seem to have resulted in a more modest view of the country's place in the world, or a more prudent approach to military spending. Instead, an addiction to hegemonic status continues to blight the prospects for sound fiscal policy. Financing the inevitable deficits inexorably turns the dollar into an imperial instrument that threatens the world with inflation.

**The alternative is Chinese failed attempts at heg which link to their turns but doesn’t solve any of our offense**

**Brezezinski 12** [Zbigniew. National Security Advisor for the Carter Administration, Professor of Foreign Policy @ Johns Hopkins. “After America” Foreign Policy, 1/3/12. ln]

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, **the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international s**tatus **quo reinforced by America's global preeminence** -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

# a/t: monteiro

**Monteiro’s wrong**

**Busby 12**, Josh, assistant professor of public affairs at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs [“Josh Busby on Unipolarity and International Relations,” January 6th, http://www.strausscenter.org/strauss-news/josh-busby-on-unipolarity-and-international-relations.html]

Strauss Scholar, Joshua Busby, wrote a three-part piece on the blog The Duck of Minerva, responding to two articles published by University of Chicago scholars Nuno Monteiro, and Sebastian Rosato and John Schuessler. The articles, and Busby’s response, focus on international relations, unipolarity and the realist approach to foreign policy. Busby’s first post critiques Nuno Monteiro’s article, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful” published in International Security. Monteiro argued that unipolarity has been less peaceful than other time periods. Busby disagrees with this argument, citing the contemporary era may create a “presentist bias” due to the overemphasis of our own lived experience and the omnipresence of the news media. Finally Busby addressed Moneiro’s argument that unipolarity drives conflict. Busby argues that **domestic-level factors in** both the United States and **potential adversaries, rather than U.S. power** alone, help explain recent conflicts.

**Monteiro agrees the alt doesn’t solve**

**Cambanis 12**, Thanassis, journalist, expert on Mideast policy[“The lonely superpower,” January 22nd, <http://articles.boston.com/2012-01-22/ideas/30646076_1_cold-war-nuclear-war-arms-race/5>]

Not everyone agrees that the United States would benefit from having a major rival. The best-known academic authority on American unipolarity, Dartmouth College political scientist William C. Wohlforth, argues that it’s still far better to be alone at the top. Overall, Wohlforth says, America spends less of its budget on defense than during the Cold War, and fewer Americans are killed in the conflicts in which it does engage. “Those who wish to have a peer competitor back are mistaken,” he said. “They forget the huge interventions of the Cold War.” Between 1945 and 1989, Wohlforth says, proxy wars between America and the Soviet Union killed hundreds of thousands of people, against the backdrop of a very real and terrifying threat of nuclear annihilation. Today, he says, the world is still dangerous, but it’s much less deadly and frightening than it was in the time of the nuclear arms race. For his part, Monteiro agrees that the Cold War was nasty and scary; he just wants to debunk the notion that what came next was any better. **According to Monteiro, bipolarity and unipolarity** pose different kinds of dangers, but **are equally problematic**.

**Concedes heg is key to solve great power war**

**Monteiro 11** \*Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University [<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064>, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful”]

In addition, Wohlforth claims that wars among major powers are unlikely, because the unipole will prevent conflict from erupting among important states. He writes, “The sole pole’s power advantages matter only to the degree that it is engaged, and it is most likely to be engaged in politics among the other major powers. 44 **I agree** that if the unipole were to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance, major power wars would be unlikely. Yet, there is no compelling reason to expect that it will always follow such a course. Should the unipole decide to disengage, as Wohlforth implies, **major power wars would be possible**

**Heg solves the impact**

**Brzezinski 12** - National Security Advisor in the Carter Administration, Professor of Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University (Zbigniew 2012 “Strategic Vision: America and the crisis for global power” book

Last but not least, even though China and India today maintain a responsible nuclear posture of minimal deterrence and “no first use,” the uncertainty of an increasingly nuclear world could force both states to reevaluate and escalate their nuclear posture. Indeed, they as well as Russia might even become inclined to extend nuclear assurances to their respective client states. **Not only could this signal** a renewed regional nuclear arms race **between these three aspiring powers but it could also create new and antagonistic spheres of influence in Eurasia driven by competitive nuclear deterrence.** The decline of the United States would thus precipitate drastic changes to the nuclear domain. An increase in proliferation among insecure American allies and/or an arms race between the emerging Asian powers are among the more likely outcomes. This ripple effect of proliferation would undermine the transparent management of the nuclear domain and increase the likelihood of interstate rivalry, miscalculation, and eventually even perhaps of international nuclear terror.

# a/t: balancing

**Won’t happen**

**Wohlforth 12**, William, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of. Foreign Service at Georgetown University [“How Not to Evaluate Theories,” International Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 219–222]

For nearly 20 years, Layne, Kenneth Waltz, and other balance-of-power realists have proclaimed multipolarity’s imminent return. They have been crystal clear in identifying balancing as the chief causal mechanism that would produce this outcome. Their argument attracted so much attention in large part because it was simple and appeared to flow logically from their theory: ‘‘overwhelming power repels and leads others to try to balance against it’’ (Waltz 2000:28). As Layne (1993:92) stressed, ‘‘balancing has especially strong explanatory power in accounting for the [fact] that unipolarity tends to be short-lived …’’ He predicted that ‘‘Unipolarity will stimulate the emergence of eligible states as great powers, [and will] cause other states to balance against the United States’’ (Layne 1993:51). Waltz (1997:915) agreed: ‘‘Some of the weaker states in the system will … act to restore a balance and move the system back to bi- or multipolarity.’’ In all of the many papers they wrote on the subject, Layne and Waltz consistently claimed to see balancing processes already under way. ‘‘Multipolarity is developing before our eyes,’’ Waltz (1997:915) wrote. ‘‘To all but the myopic, it can already be seen on the horizon. Moreover, it is emerging in according with the balancing imperative’’ (Waltz 1997:915). In my 1999 article, I argued that Layne, Waltz, and other realists were using a theory whose scope conditions did not obtain (Wohlforth 1999). Their theory predicts reactions to a rising power that might attain preponderance, not responses to a state whose preponderance is already firmly established. Even if one accepted the veracity of the whole Waltzian project, I argued, a properly specified theory predicted that unipolarity would be peaceful and durable: peaceful because two key causes for great-power war—systemic balancing and counterhegemonic rivalry—were absent (cf. Monteiro 2012) and durable because the speedy route to equilibrium— balancing—was for all practical purposes not in the cards. My arguments for why balancing was so unlikely came straight from standard realist theory. In a nutshell, the size and comprehensiveness of the capabilities gap meant contenders had a long way to go, and unipolarity’s geography (America’s offshore location, the contenders for peer status all clustered in or around Eurasia) meant that local balancing was likely to impede internal or external efforts to restore systemic equilibrium.

**Bad scholarship**

**Wohlforth 12**, William, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of. Foreign Service at Georgetown University [“How Not to Evaluate Theories,” International Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 219–222]

At issue are not the facts, but their implications for scholarship. How come every theoretical implication Layne seeks to draw from these facts strikes me as clearly wrong? Cycling between the earlier writings of Layne and other balance-of-power realists, my own work, and Layne’s present essay yields an answer: a lack of analytical consistency. On vivid display in ‘‘This Time It’s Real,’’ this inconsistency is hardly random. Rather, it is all skewed toward an effort to claim that recent events vindicate Layne’s and other balance-of-power realists’ prediction from the early 1990s: unipolarity generates systemic pressures that rapidly move the system back to multipolarity. I argued elsewhere (Wohlforth 1999) that this prediction derives from an unreflective and ultimately flawed application of neorealist balance-of power theory to a novel unipolar setting. **There was no theoretical basis for the prediction that unipolarity would spark balancing that would rapidly usher in multipolarity**. And, as it turns out, there is no evidence that this has occurred or is about to occur. Layne is only able to imply otherwise by committing four serious analytical missteps.

**heg causes bandwagoning solves balancing**

**Zhang and Shi 11** - 1/22 – \*Yuhan Zhang is a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.; Lin Shi is from Columbia University. She also serves as an independent consultant for the Eurasia Group and a consultant for the World Bank in Washington, D.C. (America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/>)

Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one **where great power wars** re**-emerge**, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

**Transition wars**

**Evans 10**, Michael, Fellow at the Australian Defence College, Canberra [“Power and Paradox: Asian Geopolitics and Sino-American Relations in the 21st Century,” Seapower: The Official Publication of the Navy League of the United States, vol 53. 2 (Feb. 2010), pp. 12-15]

The primacist, or ‘‘strategic competition’’ school, takes a hard-edged realist view of Asia’s future as portrayed by Western scholars and defense analysts such as Aaron L. Friedberg, John J. Mearsheimer, Robyn Lim and Hugh White.13 They argue that Europe’s pre-1945 past is likely to be Asia’s future. In their view, Asia eerily resembles Europe of the belle e´poque prior to 1914. China’s rise in twenty-first century Asia is analogous to that of nineteenth century Imperial Germany in Europe with Beijing emerging as an inevitable strategic competitor of the U.S. In Friedberg’s now famous phrase, the region is ‘‘ripe for rivalry.’’14 Hugh White sums up the prevailing wisdom of the primacist school namely, that, in understanding balance of power relationships, ‘‘there seems no better way to frame questions about Asia’s future than in terms of the European past.’’15 For the primacists there is a zero-sum game of power politics at work in Asia that differs little from Thucydides’s famous observation about the Peloponnesian War: ‘‘the growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable.’’16 Transpose China for Athens and Sparta for the United States and we have John Mearsheimer’s doctrine of offensive realism based on the ‘‘tragedy of great power politics.’’ As Mearsheimer writes, ‘‘the question at hand is simple and profound: will China rise peacefully? My answer is no.’’ If China continues its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades ‘‘intense security competition’’ will occur with considerable potential for war.17 Similarly, Robyn Lim notes, that the competitive interaction of economic development, military technology, strategic geography and national interest makes a future systemic crisis among the ‘‘quadrilateral powers’’ of the United States, China, Japan and Russia not simply thinkable but highly likely. Economic interdependence, the spread of democracy and multilateralism are unlikely to act as countervailing solvents to the traditional dynamics of great power conflict.18 In particular, great power strategic competition is likely to create an adversarial relationship between Beijing and Washington. As a result, in White’s words, ‘‘war in Asia remains thinkable because the international order that has kept the peace for more than 30 years is under pressure.’’19 For primacists, then, competition between rising and dominant great powers is a fixed historical rule. As David Shambaugh has observed, ‘‘zero sum competition is a virtual law of international relations, at least for the realist school.’’20 In an anarchic international system, Sino-American strategic competition is inevitable and, given China’s rapid rise, a ‘‘power transition’’ struggle is likely. In consequence, the United States as the dominant power has little choice but to keep its Asian alliance system in good order— particularly the Japanese alliance—if it is to contain China’s rise in the long term. In this context, it is no accident that within the second Bush Administration, Richard Armitage, as Deputy Secretary of State, advocated a calibrated upgrading of the U.S.-Japanese alliance describing Japan as the United States’ ‘‘Great Britain of the East.’’21 Primacists believe that Deng Xiaoping’s late twentieth century strategy of capitalist economic growth will translate into a twenty-first century challenge to the U.S. brokered status quo. They point to Chinese military modernization in general, and to its anti-access/area-denial missile strategy in particular, to highlight their concerns. As Friedberg puts it, the United States is increasingly threatened by ‘‘a combination of [Chinese] torpedoes, high-speed cruise missiles and land-based ballistic missiles’’ designed to cripple the great symbol of U.S. power-projection in Asia, namely its carrier fleet.22 Others highlight China’s stealthy ‘‘string of pearls’’ strategy of ‘‘building presence’’— that stretches through the South China littorals, the Strait of Malacca across the Indian Ocean and on to the Persian Gulf—as a precursor to future expeditionary bases in countries such as Pakistan, Burma, Bangladesh, Cambodia and along the Horn of Africa.23 The primacist view of inevitable great power competition is supported by several observers of Chinese naval development, such as Mayan Chanda, James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, who foresee the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) transitioning froma defensive anti-access force into a fully-fledged offensive blue water fleet.24 For Chanda, China is in the process of developing a ‘‘crouching tiger, swimming dragon’’ strategy based on ‘‘creeping assertiveness’’ towards the projection of long-range naval capability and the acquisition of expeditionary forces.25 Similarly, in their various publications on Chinese naval ambitions, Holmes and Yoshihara also argue that China, traditionally a continental power, is gradually turning its geopolitical ambitions seaward. Three reasons explain Beijing’s ‘‘turn to Mahan.’’ First, the traditional landward threats China once faced from Central Asia are now much diminished because relations with Russia are relatively stable. As a result, future conflict is far more likely in China’s oceanic periphery, not its continental hinterlands. Second, China’s huge energy dependence on foreign oil demands the development of a Mahanian bluewater fleet to secure its sea lines of communications in the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca. Third, of course, there is the Taiwan imperative. In the South China Sea, Taiwan is ‘‘the Gibraltar of the East’’ and holds the strategic central position off China’s mainland in the island chain overlooking the Western Pacific and so controls the throat of the Malacca Strait that is vital to Chinese economic prosperity.26 For Holmes and Yoshihara, these strategic realities suggest that, in the long term, China will, like the Kaiser’s Germany before it, manifest a powerful ‘‘strategic will’’ to develop an oceanic navy. Consequently, it is folly for Western analysts to believe that Beijing will settle for the maritime status quo and thus permanent naval inferiority in the form of its current asymmetric strategy of anti-access sea denial. Such a strategy is unlikely to endure as China grows richer and more powerful. Over the next two decades, the U.S. Navy must re-study Tirpitz and Wegener and expect the emergence of a powerful twenty-first century Chinese version of the German High Seas fleet.27 Holmes and Yoshihara conclude pessimistically that ‘‘the combination of permissive [continental] surroundings, burgeoning resources, and indomitable strategic will promises to make China a more formidable, more determined competitor at sea than Germany ever was.’’28

**Plan solves military oil entanglement**

Buis ’12 (Tom Buis, CEO, Growth Energy, Co-written by Buis and Growth Energy Board Co-Chair Gen. Wesley K. Clark (Ret.), “American Families Need American Fuel”, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/powering-our-military-whats-th.php>, May 23, 2012, LEQ)

Our nation is dangerously dependent on foreign oil. We import some 9 million barrels per day, or over 3 billion barrels per year; the U.S. military itself comprises two percent of the nation’s total petroleum use, making it the world’s largest consumer of energy and oil imports. Of U.S. foreign oil imports, one out of five barrels comes from unfriendly nations and volatile areas, including at least 20 percent stemming from the Persian Gulf, including Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Further, our nation heavily relies on hot-beds of extremism, as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Nigeria are our third, fourth, and fifth, respectively, largest exporters of oil. How dangerous is this? Very! Not only does America’s huge appetite for oil entangle us into complicated relationships with nations marred by unstable political, economic, and security situations, it also gravely impacts our military, who risk their lives daily to protect foreign energy supply routes. Because of our addiction to oil, we have been in almost constant military conflict, lost more than 6,500 soldiers and created a whole new class of wounded warriors, thousands of whom will need long-term care funded by our government. One in eight soldiers killed or wounded in Iraq from 2003-2007 were protecting fuel convoys, with a total of 3,000 Army casualties alone. We maintain extra military forces at an annual cost of about $150 billion annually, just to assure access to foreign oil - because we know that if that stream of 9 million barrels per day is seriously interrupted, our economy will crash. That's what I call dangerously dependent. Even worse, according to a new Bloomberg Government analysis, Pentagon spending on fuel is dramatically increasing. This will force the military to dedicate even more funds toward energy costs, at the expense of other priorities, like training and paying soldiers. In fact, every $.25 increase in the cost of jet fuel makes a $1 billion difference in the Department of Defense’s bottom line – a debt that will be passed along to the American taxpayer. And if that's not enough to make you want to avoid foreign oil, then consider this: every dollar hike in the international, politically-rigged price of oil hands Iran about $3 million more per day, that their regime can use to sow mischief, fund terrorism, and develop missiles and nuclear weapons. Enough is enough! We have domestic alternatives that can protect American interests, and promote prosperity and security – including, more domestic oil production, using natural gas and biofuels, like ethanol, as fuel, converting coal to liquid fuel, and moving as rapidly as possible to vehicles powered by green energy. By introducing clean energy and fuel alternatives, this would rapidly reduce both the strain of securing foreign energy supply routes in unstable regions, as well as unnecessary economic and political entanglement with volatile regimes. It is imperative the U.S. military leverage its position as a leader and enact pertinent energy policies to best enhance American energy – and national – security.

**Those escalate and turn their offense**

Collina 5 (Executive Director of 20-20 Vision, Tom Z. Collina, Executive Director of 20-20Vision; testimony in front of Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs United States Senate “Oil Dependence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Real Dangers, Realistic Solutions”. October 19, 2005 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2005_hr/051020-collina.pdf>)

More conflicts in the Middle East America imports almost 60% of its oil today and, at this rate, we’ll import 70% by 2025. Where will that oil come from? Two-thirds of the world’s oil is in the Middle East, primarily in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. The United States has less than 3% of global oil. The Department of Energy predicts that North American oil imports from the Persian Gulf will double from 2001 to 2025.i Other oil suppliers, such as Venezuela, Russia, and West Africa, are also politically unstable and hold no significant long-term oil reserves compared to those in the Middle East. Bottom line: our economy and security are increasingly dependent on one of the most unstable regions on earth. Unless we change our ways, we will find ourselves even more at the mercy of Middle East oil and thus more likely to get involved in future conflicts. The greater our dependence on oil, the greater the pressure to protect and control that oil. The growing American dependence on imported oil is the primary driver of U.S. foreign and military policy today, particularly in the Middle East, and motivates an aggressive military policy now on display in Iraq. To help avoid similar wars in the future and to encourage a more cooperative, responsible, and multilateral foreign policy the United States must significantly reduce its oil use. Before the Iraq war started, Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said: “Regardless of whether we say so publicly, we will go to war, because Saddam sits at the center of a region with more than 60 percent of all the world's oil reserves.” Unfortunately, he was right. In fact, the use of military power to protect the flow of oil has been a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy since 1945. That was the year that President Franklin D. Roosevelt promised King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia that the United States would protect the kingdom in return for special access to Saudi oil—a promise that governs U.S. foreign policy today. This policy was formalized by President Jimmy Carter in 1980 when he announced that the secure flow of oil from the Persian Gulf was in “the vital interests of the United States of America” and that America would use “any means necessary, including military force” to protect those interests from outside forces. This doctrine was expanded by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 to cover internal threats, and was used by the first President Bush to justify the Gulf War of 1990-91, and provided a key, if unspoken rationale for the second President Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003.ii The Carter/Reagan Doctrine also led to the build up of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf on a permanent basis and to the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The United States now spends over $50 Billion per year (in peacetime) to maintain our readiness to intervene in the Gulf.iii America has tried to address its oil vulnerability by using our military to protect supply routes and to prop up or install friendly regimes. But as Iraq shows the price is astronomical—$200 Billion and counting. Moreover, it doesn’t work—Iraq is now producing less oil than it did before the invasion. While the reasons behind the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq may be complex, can anyone doubt that we would not be there today if Iraq exported coffee instead of oil? It is time for a new approach. Americans are no longer willing to support U.S. misadventures in the Persian Gulf. Recent polls show that almost two-thirds of Americans think the Iraq war was not worth the price in terms of blood and treasure. Lt. Gen William Odom, director of the National Security Agency during President Reagan's second term, recently said: "The invasion of Iraq will turn out to be the greatest strategic disaster in U.S. history." The nation is understandably split about what to do now in Iraq, but there appears to be widespread agreement that America should not make the same mistake again—and we can take a giant step toward that goal by reducing our dependence on oil.

# 2ac incentive

**we meet – we give the industry money and tax credits**

**Epa.gov 12** [“Solar Power Purchase Agreements,” May 24th, <http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/buygp/solarpower.htm>]

A Solar Power Purchase Agreement (SPPA) is a financial arrangement in which a third-party developer owns, operates, and maintains the photovoltaic (PV) system, and a host customer agrees to site the system on its roof or elsewhere on its property and purchases the system’s electric output from the solar services provider for a predetermined period. This financial arrangement allows the host customer to receive stable, and sometimes lower cost electricity, while the solar services provider or another party acquires valuable financial benefits such as tax credits and income generated from the sale of electricity to the host customer.

**DoE says we’re T**

**Waxman 98 –** Solicitor General of the US (Seth, Brief for the United States in Opposition for the US Supreme Court case HARBERT/LUMMUS AGRIFUELS PROJECTS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/1998/0responses/98-0697.resp.opp.pdf)

2 On November 15, 1986, Keefe was delegated “the authority, with respect to actions valued at $50 million or less, to approve, execute, enter into, modify, administer, closeout, terminate and take any other necessary and appropriate action (collectively, ‘Actions’) with respect to Financial Incentive awards.” Pet. App. 68, 111-112. Citing DOE Order No. 5700.5 (Jan. 12, 1981), the delegation defines “Financial Incentives” as the authorized financial incentive programs of DOE, “including direct loans, loan guarantees, purchase agreements, price supports, guaranteed market agreements and any others which may evolve.” The delegation proceeds to state, “[h]owever, a separate prior written approval of any such action must be given by or concurred in by Keefe to accompany the action.” The delegation also states that its exercise “shall be governed by the rules and regulations of [DOE] and policies and procedures prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate(s).” Pet. App. 111-113.

**Interpretation – incentives are the disbursement of public funds**

**Gielecki 1**, Mark, economist with the Energy Information Administration, Fred Mayes, Senior Technical Advisor for the coal, nuclear, and renewables program within the EIA, Lawrence Prete, retired from the EIA, [“Incentives, Mandates, and Government Programs for Promoting Renewable Energy,” February, <http://lobby.la.psu.edu/_107th/128_PURPA/Agency_Activities/EIA/Incentive_Mandates_and_Government.htm>]

Over the years, incentives and mandates for renewable energy have been used to advance different energy policies, such as ensuring energy security or promoting environmentally benign energy sources. Renewable energy has beneficial attributes, such as low emissions and replenishable energy supply, that are not fully reflected in the market price. Accordingly, governments have used a variety of programs to promote renewable energy resources, technologies, and renewable-based transportation fuels. (1) This paper discusses: (1) financial incentives and regulatory mandates used by Federal and State governments and Federal research and development (R&D), (2), (3) and (2) their effectiveness in promoting renewables. A financial incentive is defined in this report as providing one or more of the following benefits: A transfer of economic resources by the Government to the buyer or seller of a good or service that has the effect of reducing the price paid, or, increasing the price received, respectively; Reducing the cost of production of the good or service; or, Creating or expanding a market for producers. The intended effect of a financial incentive is to increase the production or consumption of the good or service over what it otherwise would have been without the incentive. Examples of financial incentives are: tax credits, production payments, trust funds, and low-cost loans. Research and development is included as a support program because its effect is to decrease cost, thus enhancing the commercial viability of the good(s) provided. (4)

**aff ground – they destroy nuclear affs which are the heart of the topic – outweighs because it’s a prerequisite to clash**

**Good is good enough – competing interpretations forces a race to the bottom and judge intervention – this is no less arbitrary than deciding limits are key**

# 2ac K

**Framework – debate should be about the consequences of the plan were it to be done by the federal government – infinite number of assumptions and possible alt actors guts predictability**

**Key to avoid technocrat fill-in**

**Kuzemko 12** [Caroline Kuzemko, CSGR University of Warwick, Security, the State and Political Agency: Putting ‘Politics’ back into UK Energy, <http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2012/381_61.pdf>]

Both Hay (2007) and Flinders and Buller (2006) suggest that there are other forms that depoliticisation can take, or in the terminology of Flinders and Buller ‘tactics’ which politicians can pursue in order to move a policy field to a more indirect governing relationship (Flinders and Buller 2006: 296). For the purposes of understanding the depoliticisation of UK energy policy, however, two of Colin Hay’s forms of depoliticisation are most useful: the ‘… offloading of areas of formal political responsibility to the market…’ and the passing of policymaking responsibility to quasipublic, or independent, authorities (Hay 2007: 82-3). 1 What each of these forms of depoliticisation has in common is the degree to which they can serve, over time, to reduce political capacity by removing processes of deliberation and contestation, thereby reducing the ability for informed agency and choice. In that politics can be understood as being inclusive of processes of deliberation, contestation, informed agency and collective choice the lack of deliberation and capacity for informed agency would result in sub-optimal politics (Hay 2007: 67; cf. Gamble 2000; Wood 2011; Jenkins 2011). There seems little doubt that, with regard to energy as a policy area, the principal of establishing a more indirect governing system had become accepted by UK political elites. One of the very few close observers of UK energy policy from the 1980s to early 2000s claims that both Conservative and New Labour politicians had actively sought to remove energy from politics, making it an ‘economic’ subject: From the early 1980s, British energy policy, and its associated regulatory regime, was designed to transform a state-owned and directed sector into a normal commodity market. Competition and 1 "These"forms"are"referred"to"elsewhere"by"the"author"as"‘marketised’"and"‘technocratic’"depoliticisation"(Kuzemko" 2012b:").liberalization would, its architects hoped, take energy out of the political arena… Labour shared this vision and hoped that energy would drop off the political agenda…. (Helm 2003: 386) 2 As already suggested this paper considers the intention to depoliticise energy to have been reasonably successful. By the early 2000s the Energy Ministry had been disbanded, there was little or no formal Parliamentary debate, energy was not represented at Cabinet level, responsibility for the supply of energy had been passed to the markets, it was regulated by an independent body, and the (cf. Kuzemko 2012b). Furthermore, the newly formed Energy Directorate within the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which now had responsibility for energy policy, had no specific energy mandates but instead mandates regarding encouraging the right conditions for business with an emphasis on competition (Helm et al 1989: 55; cf. Kuzemko 2012b: 107). As feared by various analysts who write about depoliticisation as a sub-optimal form of politics, these processes of depoliticisation had arguably resulted in a lack of deliberation about energy and its governance outside of narrow technocratic elite circles. Within these circles energy systems were modelled, language was specific and often unintelligible to others, including generalist politicians or wider publics, and this did, indeed, further encourage a high degree of disengagement with the subject (cf. Kern 2010; Kuzemko 2012b; Stern 1987). Technical language and hiring practices that emphasised certain forms of economic education further isolated elite technocratic circles from political contestation and other forms of knowledge about energy. Arguably, by placing those actors who have been elected to represent the national collective interest at one remove from processes of energy governance the result was a lack of formal political capacity in this policy field. It is worth, briefly, at this point reiterating the paradoxical nature of depoliticisation. Whilst decisions to depoliticise are deeply political, political capacity to deliberate, contest and act in an issue area can be reduced through these processes. Depoliticisation has been an ongoing form of governing throughout the 20 th century it may (Burnham 2001: 464), however, be particularly powerful and more difficult to reverse when underpinned by increasingly dominant ideas about how best to govern. For example Hay, in looking for the domestic sources of depoliticisation in the 1980s and 1990s, suggests that these processes were firmly underpinned by neoliberal and public choice ideas not only about the role of the state but also about the ability for political actors to make sound decisions relating, in particular, to economic governance (Hay 2007: 95-99). Given the degree to which such ideas were held increasingly to be legitimate over this time period depoliticisation was, arguably, genuinely understood by many as a process that would result in better governance (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 15 cf. Hay 2007: 94; Kern 2010). This to a certain extent makes decisions to depoliticise appear both less instrumental but also harder to reverse given the degree to which such ideas become further entrenched via processes of depoliticisation (cf. Kuzemko 2012b: 61-66; Wood 2011: 7).

**Key to political change**

**McClean ‘1**

[David. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy. “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope” [www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/2001%2520Conference/Discussion%2520papers/david\_mcclean.htm+foucault+habermas+slapped+cud&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1](http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/2001%2520Conference/Discussion%2520papers/david_mcclean.htm+foucault+habermas+slapped+cud&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1) 2001]

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a **Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country.** Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).[(1)](E:\\WINDOWS\\Temporary Internet Files\\Content.IE5\\OTKXU3YH\\the city.htm" \l "N_1_) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the **character** of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

**Nuclear technocracy’s key to solve**

Nordhaus 11, chairman – Breakthrough Instiute, and Shellenberger, president – Breakthrough Insitute, MA cultural anthropology – University of California, Santa Cruz, 2/25/‘11

(Ted and Michael, <http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/the_long_death_of_environmenta>)

Tenth, we are going to have to get over our suspicion of technology, especially nuclear power. There is **no credible path** to reducing global carbon emissions without an enormous expansion of nuclear power. It is the only low carbon technology we have today with the demonstrated capability to generate large quantities of centrally generated electrtic power. It is the low carbon of technology of choice for much of the rest of the world. Even uber-green nations, like Germany and Sweden, have reversed plans to phase out nuclear power as they have begun to reconcile their energy needs with their climate commitments. Eleventh, we will need to embrace again the role of the state as a direct provider of public goods. The modern environmental movement, borne of the new left rejection of social authority of all sorts, has embraced the notion of state regulation and even creation of private markets while largely rejecting the generative role of the state. In the modern environmental imagination, government promotion of technology - whether nuclear power, the green revolution, synfuels, or ethanol - almost always ends badly. Never mind that virtually the entire history of American industrialization and technological innovation is the story of government investments in the development and commercialization of new technologies. Think of a transformative technology over the last century - computers, the Internet, pharmaceutical drugs, jet turbines, cellular telephones, nuclear power - and what you will find is government investing in those technologies at a scale that private firms simply cannot replicate. Twelveth, big is beautiful. The rising economies of the developing world will continue to develop whether we want them to or not. The solution to the ecological crises wrought by modernity, technology, and progress will be more modernity, technology, and progress. The solutions to the ecological challenges faced by a planet of 6 billion going on 9 billion will not be decentralized energy technologies like solar panels, small scale organic agriculture, and a drawing of unenforceable boundaries around what remains of our ecological inheritance, be it the rainforests of the Amazon or the chemical composition of the atmosphere. Rather, these solutions will be: large central station power technologies that can meet the energy needs of billions of people increasingly living in the dense mega-cities of the global south without emitting carbon dioxide, further intensification of industrial scale agriculture to meet the nutritional needs of a population that is not only growing but eating higher up the food chain, and a whole suite of new agricultural, desalinization and other technologies for gardening planet Earth that might allow us not only to pull back from forests and other threatened ecosystems but also to create new ones. The New Ecological Politics The great ecological challenges that our generation faces demands an ecological politics that is **generative, not restrictive.** An ecological politics capable of addressing global warming will require us to reexamine virtually every prominent strand of post-war green ideology. From Paul Erlich's warnings of a population bomb to The Club of Rome's "Limits to Growth," contemporary ecological politics have consistently embraced green Malthusianism despite the fact that the Malthusian premise has persistently failed for the better part of three centuries. Indeed, the green revolution was exponentially increasing agricultural yields at the very moment that Erlich was predicting mass starvation and the serial predictions of peak oil and various others resource collapses that have followed have continue to fail. This does not mean that Malthusian outcomes are impossible, but neither are they inevitable. **We do have a choice** in the matter, but it is not the choice that greens have long imagined. The choice that humanity faces is not whether to constrain our growth, development, and aspirations or die. It is whether we will continue to innovate and accelerate technological progress in order to thrive. Human technology and ingenuity have repeatedly confounded Malthusian predictions yet green ideology continues to cast a suspect eye towards the very technologies that have allowed us to avoid resource and ecological catastrophes. But such solutions will require environmentalists to abandon the "small is beautiful" ethic that has also characterized environmental thought since the 1960's. We, the most secure, affluent, and thoroughly modern human beings to have ever lived upon the planet, must abandon both the dark, zero-sum Malthusian visions and the idealized and nostalgic fantasies for a simpler, more bucolic past in which humans lived in harmony with Nature.

**The role of the judge is to evaluate the terminal consequences of plan action. Any alternative condemns innocents to suffering - key to ethics.**

**Murray 97** (Alastair, Professor of Politics at U. Of Wales-Swansea, *Reconstructing Realism*, p. 110)

Weber emphasised that, while the 'absolute ethic of the gospel' must be taken seriously, it is inadequate to the tasks of evaluation presented by politics. Against this 'ethic of ultimate ends' — Gesinnung — he therefore proposed the 'ethic of responsibility' — Verantwortung. First, whilst the former dictates only the purity of intentions and pays no attention to consequences, the ethic of responsibility commands acknowledgement of the divergence between intention and result. Its adherent 'does not feel in a position to burden others with the results of his [OR HER] own actions so far as he was able to foresee them; he [OR SHE] will say: these results are ascribed to my action'. Second, the 'ethic of ultimate ends' is incapable of dealing adequately with the moral dilemma presented by the necessity of using evil means to achieve moral ends: Everything that is striven for through political action operating with violent means and following an ethic of responsibility endangers the 'salvation of the soul.' If, however, one chases after the ultimate good in a war of beliefs, following a pure ethic of absolute ends, then the goals may be changed and discredited for generations, because responsibility for consequences is lacking. The 'ethic of responsibility', on the other hand, can accommodate this paradox and limit the employment of such means, because it accepts responsibility for the consequences which they imply. Thus, Weber maintains that only the ethic of responsibility can cope with the 'inner tension' between the 'demon of politics' and 'the god of love'. 9 The realists followed this conception closely in their formulation of a political ethic.10 This influence is particularly clear in Morgenthau.11 In terms of the first element of this conception, the rejection of a purely deontological ethic, Morgenthau echoed Weber's formulation, arguing tha/t:the political actor has, beyond the general moral duties, a special moral responsibility to act wisely ... The individual, acting on his own behalf, may act unwisely without moral reproach as long as the consequences of his inexpedient action concern only [HER OR] himself. What is done in the political sphere by its very nature concerns others who must suffer from unwise action. What is here done with good sintentions but unwisely and hence with disastrous results is morally defective; for it violates the ethics of responsibility to which all action affecting others, and hence political action par excellence, is subject.12 This led Morgenthau to argue, in terms of the concern to reject doctrines which advocate that the end justifies the means, that the impossibility of the logic underlying this doctrine 'leads to the negation of absolute ethical judgements altogether'.13

**No prior questions**

**Owen 2 –** David, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to **prioritise** issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a **simple function** of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this **does not undermine** the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may **provide the best account available to us.** In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most importantkind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, **it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR.** Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous **grip on** the **action,** event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a **reductionist program’** in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the **preferred model** or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, **this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science** since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, **not to be prejudged** before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of **generality over** that of **empirical validity.** The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates **the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right**, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially **vicious circle arises.**

**Ecosecurity discourse key to solvency**

**Matthew 2**, Richard A, associate professor of international relations and environmental political at the University of California at Irvine, Summer (ECSP Report 8:109-124)

In addition, **environmental security's language** and findings can benefit conservation and sustainable development."' Much environmental security literature emphasizes the importance of development assistance, sustainable livelihoods, fair and reasonable access to environmental goods, and conservation practices as the vital upstream measures that in the long run will contribute to higher levels of human and state security. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are examples of bodies that have been quick to recognize how the language of environmental security can help them. The scarcity/conflict thesis has alerted these groups to prepare for the possibility of working on environmental rescue projects in regions that are likely to exhibit high levels of related violence and conflict. These groups are also aware that an **association with security can expand** their **acceptance and constituencies** in some countries in which the military has political control, For the first time in its history; the contemporary environmental movement can regard military and intelligence agencies as potential **allies in the struggle** to contain or reverse humangenerated environmental change. (In many situations, of course, the political history of the military--as well as its environmental record-raise serious concerns about the viability of this cooperation.) Similarly, **the language of security has provided a basis for** some **fruitful discussions** between environmental groups and representatives of extractive industries. In many parts of the world, mining and petroleum companies have become embroiled in conflict. These companies have been accused of destroying traditional economies, cultures, and environments; of political corruption; and of using private militaries to advance their interests. They have also been targets of violence, Work is now underway through the environmental security arm of the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) to address these issues with the support of multinational corporations. Third, the general conditions outlined in much environmental security research can help organizations such as USAID, the World Bank, and IUCN identify priority cases--areas in which investments are likely to have the greatest ecological and social returns. For all these reasons, IUCN elected to integrate environmental security into its general plan at the Amman Congress in 2001. Many other environmental groups and development agencies are taking this perspective seriously (e.g. Dabelko, Lonergan& Matthew, 1999). However, for the most part these efforts remain preliminary.'

Conclusions **Efforts to dismiss environment and security research and policy activities on the grounds that they have been unsuccessful are premature and misguided**. This negative criticism has all too often been based on an excessively simplified account of the research findings of Homer-Dixon and a few others. Homer-Dixon’s scarcity-conflict thesis has made important and highly visible contributions to the literature, but it is only a small part of a larger and very compelling theory. This broader theory has roots in antiquity and speaks to the pervasive conflicts and security implications of complex nature-society relationships. The theory places incidents of violence in larger structural and historical contexts while also specifying contemporarily significant clusters of variables. From this more generalized and inclusive perspective, violence and conflict are revealed rarely as a society’s endpoint and far more often as parts of complicated adaptation processes. The contemporary research on this classical problematic has helped to revive elements of security discourse and analysis that were marginalized during the Cold War. It has also made valuable contributions to our understanding of the requirements of human security, the diverse impacts of globalization, and the nature of contemporary transnational security threats. Finall,y environmental security research has been valuable in myriad ways to a range of academics, policymakers, and activists, although the full extent of these contributions remains uncertain, rather than look for reasons to abandon this research and policy agenda, **now is the time** to recognize and **to build on the** remarkable **achievements** of the entire environmental security field.