### Weak Military Worse

A weak military is worse

Feaver ‘5 - Professor of Political Science at Duke (Peter, Armed servants: agency, oversight, and civil-military relations, p. 4-5)

The civil-military problematique is so vexing because it involves balancing two vital and potentially conflicting societal desiderata. On the one hand, the military must be strong enough to prevail in war. One purpose behind establishing the military in the first place is the need, or perceived need, for military force, either to attack other groups or to ward off attacks. The military primarily exists as a guard against disaster and should always be ready even if it is never used. Moreover, its strength should be sized appropriately to meet the threats confronting the polity. It serves no purpose to establish a protection force and then to vitiate it to the point where it can no longer protect. Indeed, an inadequate military institution may **be worse than none at all. It could be a paper tiger inviting outside aggression: strong enough**in appearance to threaten powerful enemies, but not strong **enough** in fact to defend against their predations. Alternatively, it could lull leaders into a false confidence, leading them to rash behavior and then failing in the ultimate military contest.

### China Rise -> Apolarity

#### China rises causes apolarity- jacks multi-polarity

Hadar ‘10 (Leon Hadar Washington Correspondent, "Welcome to the messy multi-polar world; Expect a very fluid and unstable future with short-term US deals with the Chinese (and the Russians) over critical foreign policy issues, and as emerging powers try to exploit the differences between Washington and Beijing", lexis, 5/28/10, LEQ)

THE Obama administration's concerns over North Korea and Iran, and China's response to US pressure to 'do something' about them are providing an opportunity for Washington to get a glimpse of how the onset of a multi-polar world looks like. It is discovering that getting there requires more than just getting a little help from old friends such as Britain or Japan as it was during the Cold War. In the new world disorder, where the interests and the values of the US and the other major powers diverge, the US will not even be able to take for granted their agreement over this or that policy objective, not to mention over the means to achieve it. At best, a mishmash of ad-hoc deals as well as agreements to disagree would lead to interim and unstable arrangements like the ones that have been made by the US and China on Iran. And at worst, Washington is going to be challenged by emerging powers such as Brazil and Turkey out to undermine the US-led coalition against Teheran. Different views US policymakers currently assume that they have the right and the obligation to steer the wheel of international diplomacy - whether it is on the Korean Peninsula or in the Persian Gulf - towards a certain geo-strategic destination. The corollary of that thinking is that China and other regional and global powers are expected to assist the Americans in getting there by providing good directions, checking the oil, or kicking the tyres. Clearly, the view from Beijing (and other capitals) is very different. First, unlike the US and some of its allies, the Chinese leaders do not perceive Iran's nuclear stalemate and South Korea's accusations that the North sank a South's warship as a crisis that requires urgent response by the outside world. In fact, the main reason that Beijing is even placing these two issues somewhere on the top of its agenda is Chinese concerns over the American response and that of its allies to these developments; and in the case of South Korea and Israel, Beijing expects Washington to restrain them. President Barack Obama has hoped that his energetic nuclear nonproliferation agenda would help convince China and other governments of the urgency in joining the US in dealing with the threat of North Korea and Iran having nuclear weapons. But there is no indication that this approach is working, especially since the Chinese recognise that, notwithstanding all the platitudes about the abolition of all nuclear weapons, the Americans have not punished - and actually rewarded - India after it went nuclear. The US is also providing support to Pakistan, a failed and unstable state - where Osama bin Ladin and his cohorts reside - after it followed India's example. And noble rhetoric notwithstanding, the US decision to reach agreements with Russia on reducing nuclear arms is more a reflection of US national interests than an idealistic zero-option vision. And the fact the fact that Kim Jong Il and members of his clique continue to cling to power in Pyongyang while employing their small nuclear arsenal to deter an attack from the South is very much in line with Chinese national interest in preventing the reunification of Korea under a pro-American government. Similarly, while China is interested in preventing a pre-emptive strike by the US and/or Israel against Iran's nuclear installations, it regards Teheran as an important trade and strategic partner. China is Iran's second leading petroleum export destination (after Japan) while Iran is China's second major source of crude oil imports (after Saudi Arabia). Moreover, the spectacular growth in China's economy depends very much on having access to energy sources. About 60 per cent of its current oil imports come from the Middle East and according to some studies, the region could provide around 70 per cent of China's imports by 2015, indicating that China will have a growing interest in strengthening its influence there. Hence, while an armed conflict involving Iran that could destabilise the entire Middle East runs contrary to Chinese interests, the current American hegemony in the region could pose a long-term strategic threat to China if and when its relationship with Washington deteriorate and leads to a war over Taiwan. American hegemony In that case, the Americans could be in position to deny the Chinese access to the energy sources in the Persian Gulf. This suggests that any attempt on the part of Washington to foster long-term agreements with Beijing on North Korea and Iran as well as other regional and global problems will require the Americans to make major concessions that could affect core US national interests and force it to redefine them. Hence a reunification of Korea could take place only if China is invited to take part in determining the nature of that outcome; for example, by getting the US to terminate its current security agreement with South Korea and by securing the neutralisation of a reunified Korea. An assertive China, unlike a weak Russia, would not allow for the kind of scenario that evolved after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when a reunified Germany was invited to join Nato. Similarly, it is unlikely that the Chinese will accept any step that would lead to the military defeat of Iran by America and its allies which could create the conditions for the establishment of a Pax Americana in the entire Persian Gulf. But China may allow the Americans to use military force against Iran as part of an agreement with Washington that would bring an end to its defence agreement with Taipei and give the Chinese a green light to exert their de-facto control over the rebel territory. No US president (and Congress) will be ready any time soon to pursue these kind of policies - a neutralised reunified Korea and the abandonment of Taiwan. That would amount to inviting the Chinese to get behind the wheel, to join the US in managing the global directorate, a contemporary version of the 19th Century Congress of Vienna system. Instead, one should expect the kind of short-term deals with the Chinese (and the Russians) over Iran, Korea and other critical foreign policy issues for the US: these are not going to go in a way that would satisfy American leaders. That situation will invite other rising powers, like Brazil and Turkey, to try to exploit the differences between Washington and Beijing. It is going to be quite a messy world, a very fluid and unstable multi-polar system that will steer between war and peace - and the unstable in-between - for a long time.

### AT: EU

EU structurally crippled

Singh ‘8 – Professor, School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London (Robert, International Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, “The exceptional empire”, ProQuest, WEA)

Aside from its elusiveness currently, however, this multipolar vision also has grievous normative problems. Prior balances of great powers have rarely been either stable or benign (think of the years preceding WWI and during the 1920s and 1930s leading to WWII). Even were some new concert of major powers to be thrashed out, however, it is doubtful that such a set of rival powers would resolve the humanitarian crises, ethnic cleansing, genocides, failed states and Islamist movements that together threaten the contemporary international system. At least as pointedly, the main potential rival powers to the US are themselves inhibited by all manner of problems ranging from energy needs and environmental decay to the threat of pandemics, acute socio-economic inequalities and demographic stresses. In each, the internal tensions and strains of social, economic and political change may be as likely to retard as to advance the various emerging powers' routes to great or superpower status. The EU, for example, faces acute demographic problems that deeply complicate the still unresolved institutional and political dilemmas shaping its development. Generous welfare spending, inflexible labour markets, a rapidly aging workforce, a diminishing tax base, a declining fertility ratio and the problems of a growing but alienated Muslim population pose powerful hindrances to sustaining positive growth rates. However large its economy, the EU likewise remains a relatively minor global actor: In the near future, the European Union (EU) will be a structurally-crippled geopolitical actor. It has expanded too fast and speaks in 23 tongues. Too much of the leaders' time is spent on discussing how Europe should make its decisions. The patchwork accords reached under the German presidency in June 2007 have not solved the fundamental problem. It would only be a mild exaggeration to say that the perpetual European discussions on seating arrangement are akin to re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. The geopolitical environment around Europe has worsened while the EU has focused inwards: it faces a more troubled environment in North Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and even vis-a -vis Russia. This is a pretty dismal record. (Mahbubani, 2007, 203-204)

### AT: Euro

The Euro collapsed

Panicker '5/22 ("A change of fortunes; In a dramatic reversal, the euro has fallen more than 20% from its peak in July 2008. By G Panicker", lexis, 5/22/10, LEQ)

HOW times change. It was fashionable even as recently as January this year, to proclaim that the euro would emerge as the world's key reserve currency because the United States was weighted down by its huge trade and fiscal deficits. It was held as an article of economic faith that saver nations will, at some point, become unwilling to subsidise the penchant of Americans to consume far more than they produce. A disastrous fall in the value of the US dollar would end the unique advantage the US has enjoyed in possessing the global reserve currency since World War II. Many lent their names to this theory. Even the former Federal Reserve Board chairman, Alan Greenspan, had an inkling of the US dollar's doom. It is 'absolutely conceivable that the euro will replace the (US) dollar as the reserve currency, or will be traded as an equally important reserve currency', he told the weekly, Stern, in 2007. For now at least, all these views seem misplaced. The euro is gasping for air. In a dramatic reversal, the euro has fallen nearly 22 per cent from its peak reached in July in 2008. When it was launched in January 1999, the euro was placed at a slightly stronger level against the dollar. Then, it fell through parity and languished for three years. It went down as low as US $0.82 in October 2000, before soaring to a high of US $1.60 in July, 2008. This remarkable surge helped to spread the optimism about the euro's dominant future. Conspiracy theories began to take shape. Wasn't the euro a factor behind the invasion of Iraq? As early as 2000, Saddam Hussein, then ruler of Iraq, sought to price Iraqi oil in the then-new currency, forsaking the US dollar and laying the ground to end American hegemony. North Korea and Iran followed. Venezuela, which wanted to punish the 'American imperialists', also toyed with the idea. Russia, a major energy supplier to Europe, had half of its reserves in euros till recently. As the US dollar began to crumble, talk was rife that Opec would finish the job, delivering a deadly blow to American prestige and economy. There were reports of a secret understanding among the big oil producers to dump the US dollar. Indeed, across the world, central banks stepped up their holdings of euros in their reserves. According to the International Monetary Fund, euro-denominated reserves with central banks, excluding China, rose to 672 billion at the end of last year, from 97 billion in the first quarter of 2002. While China intends keep to diversifying its holdings, Russia has trimmed its euro reserves and Iran is having a rethink of its reserves. For years, the euro seemed to defy the question of how a common currency could run without a common government. Many economists indeed thought that, after the initial years, a recession would wreck eurozone cohesion. The scenario put out was that when a recession affects weak areas of Europe, it would lead to a conflict of interest vis-a-vis countries committed to disciplined economic policy. Weak economies with populist governments, wanting low interest rates, would be willing to put up with some inflation. But strong economies like Germany, serious about maintaining price stability at all costs, would not oblige. And Europe would struggle to handle 'the asymmetric shocks' that would follow. Language barriers and a general reluctance of European labour to move within the eurozone would further handicap the governments. The result would be a vicious political row and a potential financial crisis, as market players start to discount the bonds of weaker governments. That script is now being played out. Germany's unilateral ban on naked short-selling - which was immediately opposed by France - has exposed a lack of cohesion in the EU nations. Worries are growing about the contagion spreading. The prospect of widespread government spending cuts is raising the spectre of social unrest and political turmoil in Europe. Analysts and chartists are predicting further falls in the value of the euro, which is trading at about US $1.23 now, or close to a four-year low. So for now, and what for it is worth, the American dollar is back again as the top reserve currency and a safe haven. However, while Europe is indeed in the midst of a major crisis, the economic shockwaves can travel beyond European shores. Moreover, the US has enormous budget deficits and debts as well. And many US companies have major exposures to the European continent - all of which makes the US economy also vulnerable. So can the dollar's dominance last? Washington is constantly reminded about the need to get its fiscal house in order. South Carolina politician Mike Pitts, introduced a bill in the state legislature in February this year to mandate the state to replace Federal Reserve notes with silver and gold coins as the legal tender. He feared that the continued US dollar printing spree by the Fed would result in a systemic collapse. Indeed, many of us, like Mr Pitts, are concerned. We wonder what will be the future dominant reserve currency if the euro unravels? Will it be gold? Or is the day of the yuan getting nearer?

### Natural Gas Spikes Inevitable

#### US domestic natural gas prices are isolated from the world and local spikes are inevitable- means that nuclear energy will be cost competitive for the US

Richter ’12 (Wolf Richter is an entrepreneur, executive, and writer based in San Francisco, “Don't Believe This Gentle Forecast For Natural Gas Prices”, <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-natural-gas-massacre-and-the-price-spike-2012-7>, July 18, 2012, LEQ)

Forecasting the price of natural gas is easy. The US Energy Information Agency (EIA) does it regularly, and like all seasoned forecasters, it produces a slightly wobbly line that is trending either slightly higher or slightly lower. The graph below shows what this exercise looks like. Given that the dip before the dotted line was the April low of $1.90 per million Btu (MMBtu) at the Henry Hub, a decade low, the slight upward trend seems reasonable. So, we expect smooth sailing, with gently rising prices as is appropriate for the relaxing calm that reigns in the natural gas market. Alas, reality is a series of violent ups and down with sporadic and vicious spikes. Natural gas prices in the US have been so low for so long that producers are running into trouble. While up 46% from the April low, the recent price of $2.79/MMBtu at the Henry Hub is still too low to drill economically. Losses out into the horizon. Plunging drilling activity. Rig count down 41% from last July, at the lowest level since August 1999. A nightmare for producers. And some will go out of business. Yet, it's a conundrum in our globalized economy; or rather, proof that we don’t have a globalized economy, not when it comes to natural gas: liquefied natural gas (LNG) trades in the international markets for several times the US price. Japan has always paid the highest price (the “Japanese price,” as a sales lady in a museum shop in Korea once whispered to me as she cut the price of an item I was ogling by two-thirds). But even that price jumped following the earthquake last year, when Japan shut down its nuclear power plants one by one. By May none were operating ... though the first one is now back on line [for the shenanigans of the Japanese nuclear power industry and the rebellion against it, read.... Whitewash versus Reality: “Disaster Made in Japan”]. The hole—nearly 30% of Japan’s power generation—had to be filled. Conservation covered part of it. Switching to natural gas filled the rest. But it drove up demand that whipped prices into a froth at over $17/MMBtu. In Europe, LNG prices have hovered at almost $10/MMBtu, except for earlier this year, when they spiked to, well, Japanese levels. Japan pays almost 7 times the price that gas trades for at the Henry Hub—because the Henry Hub is irrelevant. US natural gas is landlocked. Even in the US, there are distribution bottlenecks and demand variations that can produce violent local price spikes. Early January, while gas traded for around $3/MMBtu at the Henry Hub, New York experienced a spike and paid nearly $12/MMBtu! In March, as natural gas was drifting towards its decade low at the Henry Hub, Boston briefly paid nearly $9/MMBtu. Natural gas was massacred in one place, and it spiked in another! But the US does exports natural gas. Just not LNG. There are no active LNG export terminals in the US, though given the phenomenal global price differentials, nine are planned. One of them, the Sabine Pass facility, has already received DOE authorization to export domestically produced LNG. And exports by pipeline to Canada and Mexico have been growing, but are still less than 7% of US production. So, near term, exports won’t have much impact on the price of natural gas. But US production appears to have peaked, finally, or maybe, after a historic supply-and-demand mismatch, though on a weekly basis, according to the EIA, production is still between 3% and 4% higher than the same week last year. However, given the collapse in drilling, production will eventually taper off, and might do so suddenly. Yet, demand from power generators has been skyrocketing as they’ve switched from coal to gas; and on a weekly basis, overall demand has jumped by over 10% when compared to the same week last year—and it’s burning up the record amount of gas in storage. The EIA forecast of a slight upward drift in price? Compared to the reality graph beneath it? Natural gas doesn’t correct to a sustainable price to maintain it. It’s an industry of violent spikes and horrific descents, precisely because transportation is an issue. Oversupply can’t be corrected by exporting; it causes prices to plunge. And a shortage—a scenario the US may be facing at current trends—will be corrected initially by importing LNG in competition with the rest of the world. So prices may spike once again. Meanwhile, in the shakeout, less efficient or poorly capitalized producers are wiped out—capitalism’s creative destruction. But the price has been below the cost of production for years, and the damage is now huge. Read.... Natural Gas: Where Endless Money Went to Die. Malaysia’s state-owned oil and gas company just plunked down $5.5 billion for a foothold in British Columbia's shale gas scene—though the odds of securing permission to export LNG are poor, the costs of such an endeavor immense, and the timeline very long, writes Marin Katusa in his excellent article.... The Race for Energy Resources Just Got Hotter.

### Framework

#### Debate should be about the consequences of the plan were it to be done by the federal government. This precludes non-USFG alternatives but enables kritik net benefits to counterplans.

#### The judge should posit himself as a policymaker weighing competitive policy options

#### They can weigh their epistemology indicts but that is not offense against the consequences- solves their offense

#### Otherwise they kill topic education and make it impossible to be aff- We lose the 1AC - 9 minutes timesuck

#### It’s impossible for us to win on representations alone –we need the plan to stand a chance

#### Policy education is an impact turn to their framework- their framework precludes federal policy “should” statements which can only be discussed through FIAT - otherwise someone saying "You have no control over that do not waste your time" would be correct. That would enable social tyranny through ignorance- turns their impacts- only by "letting it be" or "FIAT" can we discuss policy- obviously the plan doesn't happen.

Plan text focus key- stable/ static- can’t kick it

Conditionality justifies kicking reps- its reciprocical- the 2NC was a bunch of NK threat mongering

#### Roleplaying is key

McClean ‘1 (David E. “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Am. Phil. Conf., [www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm](http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm))

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

#### Also we can still influence the government through voting and we see ourselves as future policymakers and leaders

### Jentleson

We have a better method- a framework that incorporates both is the most productive- even if we aren’t literal policy makers

Jentleson ‘2 (Bruce W. Jentleson, Source: International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring, 2002), pp. 169-183, “Bringing Policy Relevance Back In”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092106>, Spring 2002, LEQ)

Bringing Policy Relevance Back In In the contemporary era, when debate rages not only over the foreign policy "answers" but even more fundamentally over what the defining "questions" are, dominant disciplinary norms and practices are widening the theory-policy gap, and leaving the university-based scholarly world increasingly isolated. Moreover, whereas thirty or forty years ago academics were the main if not sole cohort of experts on international affairs outside of government and inter- national institutions, today's world is a more competitive marketplace of ideas and expertise. The think tank world has grown and deepened-there are more of them dealing with a broader range of issues, and often doing so in ways that contribute significantly to literature building as well as policy debate. Many of the leading area and country specialists are now journalists who have done their own empirical work of intensive coverage of world trouble spots, and are also sufficiently grounded in relevant academic literature to use and contribute to it. It is both in the discipline's self-interest and part of its societal responsibility to link its scholarly mission more to the challenges that face the world. This was true before September 11; it is even truer since then. Policy relevance needs to be brought back in to international relations and to political science more generally. This is not an argument against theory. It is an argument for theory but with shifts in relative emphasis to foster greater policy relevance.31 Theory can have three important policy utilities. One is its diagnostic value. Policymakers need to be able to assess the nature of the problem they face, the trend they are observing, and the incipient warning signs they may be sensing. Often the prob- lem is less a dearth than a glut of information and the need to discern patterns, establish salience, and trace causal connections. What can otherwise be a seem- ingly overwhelming amount of information and detail can be organized, prioritized, and filtered through the framework that theory provides. Second, theory can have prescriptive value in contributing to the "conceptualization of strategies." Such analysis, while abstract and not itself in operational form, "identifies the critical variables of a strategy and the general logic associated with [its] successful use." Theory thus "is not in itself a strategy," but it is a valuable "starting point for constructing a strategy."32 It must be combined with other types of knowledge, especially specific understanding of the particular situation and actor at hand. Its value often is in providing the framework for putting a particular situation and strategy in the type of broader context that can facilitate the design and implementation of effective strategies. Third, theory can help with lesson drawing. It is bad enough for a policy to fail; but if the wrong lessons are drawn, that failure can have an additive and even a multiplier effect. Similarly, the benefits of a policy success can be coun- tered by lessons poorly drawn and leading to some future misapplication of what worked the first time. Theory deepens understanding of patterns of cau- sality within any particular case by penetrating beyond the situational and particularistic to identify independent variables of a more fundamental nature. It also helps broaden what can be learned from any particular subject or case. Bringing policy relevance back in thus does not mean driving theory out. In- ternational Organization, World Politics, International Security, and the American Political Science Review should continue to have distinct missions from Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and the like. But that distinction should be in terms of how policy problems are approached, not whether attention is paid to them. Greater pride of place needs to be given to research questions defined in policy terms. What drives terrorism? Which strategies can be most effective in deter- ring it, defeating it, containing it? How better to link force and diplomacy? What about prevention, and questions raised about reducing and countering the political, social, and economic dynamics that foster and feed terrorism? Be- yond just general arguments about unilateralism and multilateralism, what strategies and structures can best achieve the goals of peace, security, stability, and justice? These are all September 11 questions-comparable delineations could be drawn for those other areas of the international agenda that were there on September 10 and have not gone away. The demand for policy- relevant research is huge; it is the supply that is lagging. This sense of praxis also needs to reshape graduate programs. A Ph.D. in po- litical science or international relations should prepare students for selected nonacademic policy careers as well as academic careers. Curriculums need to have a greater degree of flexibility and pluralism with disciplinary training still at the core but also giving greater weight to substantive depth and breadth of knowledge about policy issues and domains, about regions and countries, about cultures and languages and histories. Greater engagement outside the academy needs to be fostered and encouraged: internships in Washington or with international organizations or nongovernmental organizations, participa- tion in colloquiums not just with noted academics but with eminent policy ex- perts, and dissertation and research projects that lead to immersion in key policy issues whether historical or contemporary. Nor is this just a matter of adapting curriculums. It is as much about the messages sent, explicitly and im- plicitly, in the setting of expectations and other aspects of the socialization that is so much a part of the graduate school experience. None of this will have much impact unless the academic job market also shifts toward comparable balance and pluralism in the profiles being sought for entry-level faculty. Also, a student who takes his or her Ph.D. into a career in the policy world needs to be seen as another type of placement success, not a placement failure. Greater engagement with and experience in the policy world is to be encouraged at all stages of a career. There are many opportunities-and there can be more-to help broaden perspectives, build relationships and test and sharpen arguments and beliefs in constructive ways. The same is true for engaging as a public intellectual in the ways and on the terms discussed earlier. Ultimately it is about an ethic, about what is valued, about how professional success and personal fulfillment are defined. I am again reminded of a state- ment by Vaclav Havel, this playwright turned political dissident turned leader of his country's liberation from communism and move toward democratiza- tion, in his 1990 speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress: "I am not the first, nor will I be the last, intellectual to do this. On the contrary, my feel- ing is that there will be more and more of them all the time. If the hope of the world lies in human consciousness, then it is obvious that intellectuals cannot go on forever avoiding their share of responsibility for the world and hiding their distaste for politics under an alleged need to be independent. It is easy to have independence in your program and then leave others to carry that program out. If everyone thought that way, pretty soon no one would be independent."33 None of us is likely to have the role or responsibilities that Havel has. But we too are intellectuals who must think deeply about what our roles are to be, amid the extraordinary times in which we live.

### Perm

**Extend permutation the USFG does the plan and the judge the alternative**

**It’s preferable and legit – 3 reasons:**

**1) The alt’s not mutually exclusive with the plan – nuclear power isn’t mutually exclusive with rethinking. Not an opcost**

**2) Judge choice means you can vote for the plan text but not for our discourse - most logical form of policy making (cross-apply from condo that retracting certain positions is good for it)**

**3) They’re in a double bind - if the alternative can overcome the status quo they can overcome the links to the plan**

**Plan focus is good- links should be to the plan text not representations- doesn’t disprove the affirmative is a bad idea**

**Conditionality justifies this**

**1. Reciprocal with their kicking of representations- only objective standard for fairness**

**2. Test from multiple levels- they operated on different levels with the CP and the K- we should be able to perm those**

**Not severance- the government still does 100% of the plan- all the plan text mandated. We aren’t tied to our reps only our plan text.**

**Solves all their links- judge still rethinks**

#### Doesn’t severe- DOD initiate PPA of SMRs in US and the judge reject the apocalyptic frames of the 1AC

O’Taul

**Default to worst case predictions for warming**

**Brown 2**, Donald, Director, Penn Consortium for Interdisciplinary Environmental Policy and former manager – UN organizations at the EPA [“American Heat: Ethical Problems with the United States Response to Global Warming, p. 146-147]

According to rights and duties theories, one must not engage in actions that could harm others without their consent. For this reason, rights and duties ethical theories condemn risky behavior, particularly when that behavior could kill or greatly diminish others' quality of life. Therefore, a defense of the status quo on greenhouse gas emissions in the United States on the basis of uncertainty about actual consequences is ethically unacceptable according to mainstream rights and duties ethical theories.42 This is particularly true because of the very real potential of global warming to kill hundreds of thousands of human beings and to greatly diminish the quality of life for tens, if not hundreds, of millions of living people and future generations. In thinking about how to consider the uncertain consequences of problems like global warming, some ethicists, following deontological theories, have argued that humans have a duty to be guided by a heuristic of fear in predicting consequences. That is, humans should give preference to the bad over good predictions. Particularly where there are possible serious irreversible consequences from human actions and where the stakes are high, decision makers should give more weight to prognoses of doom rather than of bliss. The philosophical reason for this duty to give more weight to the prediction of harm is premised on the notion that present generations do not have a right to gamble with the interest of other generations or to act so that life on Earth is jeopardized. For this reason, in the face of uncertainty about global warming consequences, the United States should consider potential worst-case scenarios of global warming impacts when making policy. Yet throughout global warming policymaking in the United States, whether in the calculation of costs and benefits to the United States considered in chapter 9 or in the description of likely global warming impacts to the world discussed in chapter 5, the United States has not assumed worst-case consequences. In fact, the United States has not even accepted the IPCC's projections that are based on the smooth responses of the climate system assumed by the climate models, not to mention the possibility of climate surprises discussed in chapter 5.