# Warming

**lan solve the worst impacts**

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[1] Avoiding the most serious climate change impacts will require informed policy decisions. This in turn will require information regarding the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions required to stabilize climate in a state not too much warmer than today. A new low emission scenario is simulated in a global climate model to show how some of the impacts from climate change can be averted through mitigation. Compared to a non-intervention reference scenario, emission reductions of about 70% by 2100 are required to prevent roughly half the change in temperature and precipitation that would otherwise occur. By 2100, the resulting stabilized global climate would ensure preservation of considerable Arctic sea ice and permafrost areas. Future heat waves would be 55% less intense, and sea level rise from thermal expansion would be about 57% lower than if a non-mitigation scenario was followed. 1. Introduction [2] Climate change is taking place and mankind is very likely the cause [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007]. The climate models used in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC AR4) showed global mean warming values for the end of the 21st century as large as 6C compared to present for the highest emission scenarios. Projected warming was largest over the continents and in the northern polar region. Arctic sea ice extent and thickness was projected to substantially decrease with some models showing a sea icefree Arctic in summer by 2100 [IPCC, 2007] accompanied by decreases in the extent of near surface permafrost [Lawrence and Slater, 2005; Lawrence et al., 2008]. [3] Some climate scientists have argued that a warming of 2C above pre-industrial temperatures (i.e., about 1C above today) is the threshold for dangerous climate change [Hansen et al., 2007]. The Council of the European Union in 2007 reported that large cuts in emissions are ‘‘necessary to ensure that the world stays within the 2C limit. . .’’ [Council of the European Union, 2004]. To keep the probability of exceeding a warming of 2C at a third or less, the atmospheric equivalent CO2 concentration (i.e., taking into account other greenhouse gases) must be stabilized at 450 ppm or below [Knutti et al., 2005]. The effective CO2 stabilization level therefore needs to be well below 450 ppm, and current concentrations are already at roughly 380 ppm CO2. While uncertainties in the carbon cycle lead to uncertainties in the allowable emissions for a 2C stabilization, it is clear that emission reductions in the 21st century need to be large. There must be similar emission reductions in other greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as methane, nitrous oxide, and CFCs. This is not true for ozone because its changes are largely not caused by direct emissions. [4] Comprehensive atmosphere ocean general circulation models (AOGCMs) in the IPCC AR4 focused only on non-intervention (non-mitigation) scenarios put together in the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) [Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000]. Six of the 35 scenarios are used as ‘‘illustrative’’ scenarios or storylines, but no likelihood was attached to any of the scenarios. They are examples of ‘‘what-if’’ cases, not necessarily representative of all possible outcomes. These scenarios assume technological progress (e.g., increase in energy efficiency) and, for example, changes in the energy sector, but only to the extent that these are economically beneficial. However, these scenarios do not include political intervention in the form of mitigation policies to regulate emissions in order to reduce climate change. [5] To explore the global and regional distributions of future climate change that could be avoided with aggressive mitigation policies such as increased use of conservation, renewables and CO2 capture and storage, simulations with a comprehensive climate model are performed here with a new low emission mitigation scenario compared to a business-asusual non-mitigation scenario. These scenarios were prepared by United States Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) scientists as part of a series of assessment reports. The CCSP report 2.1 [Clarke et al., 2007] provides scenarios in which carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and radiative forcings can be substantially reduced if new energy technologies and strategies are put into place.

# Oil Disad

**No link- the plan trades off with COAL in the united states- its only trades-off with oil used on MILITARY bases- that’s 2% of US oil**

Buis ’12 (Tom Buis, CEO, Growth Energy, Co-written by Buis and Growth Energy Board Co-Chair Gen. Wesley K. Clark (Ret.), “American Families Need American Fuel”, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/powering-our-military-whats-th.php>, May 23, 2012, LEQ)

Our nation is dangerously dependent on foreign oil. We import some 9 million barrels per day, or over 3 billion barrels per year; the U.S. military itself comprises two percent of the nation’s total petroleum use, making it the world’s largest consumer of energy and oil imports. Of U.S. foreign oil imports, one out of five barrels comes from unfriendly nations and volatile areas, including at least 20 percent stemming from the Persian Gulf, including Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Further, our nation heavily relies on hot-beds of extremism, as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Nigeria are our third, fourth, and fifth, respectively, largest exporters of oil. How dangerous is this? Very!

**And the military is way too insignificant- no link**

Kreutzer ’12 (David Kreutzer, Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change, Heritage Foundation, “Military Biofoolishness”, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/powering-our-military-whats-th.php>, May 21, 2012, LEQ)

The entire U.S. military currently consumes about 360,000 barrels per day of petroleum-based fuel, with 175,000 barrels per day (or less) going to the Air Force’s jets. A single platform in the Gulf of Mexico (Thunderhorse) produces as much petroleum as these jets consume and at a much lower cost than the biofuel replacements. The Keystone XL Pipeline would bring enough petroleum from a very secure Canada to meet our total military consumption two or three times over. The same story holds for other potential sources of conventional petroleum, such as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. The Air Force’s target is to replace about 26,000 barrels per day with biofuels. Whatever energy security that may provide could be doubled by a single well in the Gulf of Mexico. As a strategic policy, switching the military to biofuels can only make our enemies think we are not serious. If the entire military consumption were switched away from petroleum, that would cut worldwide demand by 0.4 percent. This cut would reduce revenues to oil producers by about 1.5 percent. Let’s hope biofuels are not anti-terrorism Plan A. Though some energy technologies that are too expensive for general civilian use may make sense for the military, biofuels are not among them. The military needs to rethink its biofuels program.

**No perception link either**

Sarewitz et al ’12 (Daniel Sarewitz and Samuel Thernstrom Co-Directors, John Alic Technical Consultant, and Writer Travis Doom Research Assistant, A joint project of CSPO and CATF, We are grateful for their time and their insights. Fred Beach Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Texas at Austin William Bonvillian Washington Office Director, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Hanna Breetz PhD Candidate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Kay Sullivan Faith Graduate Fellow, RAND Erica Fuchs Assistant Professor of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University Ken Gabriel Deputy Director, Defense Advanced Research Project Agency Anthony Galasso Director of Advanced Integration Capabilities, Boeing Phantom Works David Garman Consultant Eugene Gholz Associate Professor of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin Sherri Goodman Senior Vice President, Center for Naval Analysis Kevin Hurst Assistant Director for Energy R&D, Office of Science and Technology Policy John Jennings Deputy Director for Innovation, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Operational Energy Todd Laporte Professor of Political Science, University of California Berkley George Lea Military Branch Chief, Engineering and Construction, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Sasha Mackler Bipartisan Policy Center Jeffrey Marqusee Executive Director, SERDP and ESTCP, U.S. Department of Defense William McQuaid Liaison for DoD Energy Conservation Programs, Office of Management and Budget Srini Mirmira Commercialization, Advance Research Projects Agency-Energy Dorothy Robyn Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Installations and Environment Richard Van Atta Institute for Defense Analyses Andrew Wiedlea Defense Threat Reduction Agency Aubrey Wigner Graduate Student, Arizona State University Project Staff and Affiliates Daniel Sarewitz Co-Director, Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Arizona State University Samuel Thernstrom Senior Climate Policy Advisor, Clean Air Task Force John Alic Consultant Travis Doom Program Specialist, Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Arizona State University Joseph Chaisson Research and Technical Director, Clean Air Task Force Armond Cohen Executive Director, Clean Air Task Force Nate Gorence Associate Director for Energy Innovation, Bipartisan Policy Center Suzanne Landtiser Graphic Designer, Fine Line Studio, “Energy Innovation At The Department Of Defense Assessing The Opportunities”, March 2012, LEQ)

DoD buys fuel alongside other purchasers. It is a big customer, but not big enough to affect prices. Long-distance transport of crude oil and refined products is routine and inexpensive. So long as the world market remains effectively integrated, it would take a massive injection of substitutable alternatives to affect prices. Private investors, absent proven capability to produce alternatives in substantial quantities at competitive costs—or a package of subsidies such as those for domestic ethanol, perhaps including binding price guarantees—will find little reason to increase production capacity rapidly. Fuel is fuel, and as output of substitutable alternatives builds it will simply flow into the international market at prices little different from those for other refined petroleum products.

# Heg rocks

A stable system of deterrence prevents nuclear war – it create a stable ontological context for interaction and expectations

Lupovici 8 (Amir, Post-Doctoral Fellow Munk Centre for International Studies, Why the Cold War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse, [http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/ papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf](http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf), AD: 9/22/10) jl

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Since deterrence can become part of the actors’ identity, it is also involved in the actors’ will to achieve ontological security, securing the actors’ identity and routines. As McSweeney explains, ontological security is “the acquisition of confidence in the routines of daily life—the essential predictability of interaction through which we feel confident in knowing what is going on and that we have the practical skill to go on in this context.” These routines become part of the social structure that enables and constrains the actors’ possibilities (McSweeney, 1999: 50-1, 154-5; Wendt, 1999: 131, 229-30). Thus, through the emergence of the deterrence norm and the construction of deterrence identities, the actors create an intersubjective context and intersubjective understandings that in turn affect their interests and routines. In this context, deterrence strategy and deterrence practices are better understood by the actors, and therefore the continuous avoidance of violence is more easily achieved. Furthermore, within such a context of deterrence relations, rationality is (re)defined, clarifying the appropriate practices for a rational actor, and this, in turn, reproduces this context and the actors’ identities. Therefore, the internalization of deterrence ideas helps to explain how actors may create more cooperative practices and break away from the spiral of hostility that is forced and maintained by the identities that are attached to the security dilemma, and which lead to mutual perception of the other as an aggressive enemy. As Wendt for example suggests, in situations where states are restrained from using violence—such as MAD (mutual assured destruction)—states not only avoid violence, but “ironically, may be willing to trust each other enough to take on collective identity”. In such cases if actors believe that others have no desire to engulf them, then it will be easier to trust them and to identify with their own needs (Wendt, 1999: 358-9). In this respect, the norm of deterrence, the trust that is being built between the opponents, and the (mutual) constitution of their role identities may all lead to the creation of long term influences that preserve the practices of deterrence as well as the avoidance of violence. Since a basic level of trust is needed to attain ontological security,21 the existence of it may further strengthen the practices of deterrence and the actors’ identities of deterrer and deterred actors. In this respect, I argue that for the reasons mentioned earlier, the practices of deterrence should be understood as providing both physical and ontological security, thus refuting that there is necessarily tension between them. Exactly for this reason I argue that Rasmussen’s (2002: 331-2) assertion—according to which MAD was about enhancing ontological over physical security—is only partly correct. Certainly, MAD should be understood as providing ontological security; but it also allowed for physical security, since, compared to previous strategies and doctrines, it was all about decreasing the physical threat of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the ability to increase one dimension of security helped to enhance the other, since it strengthened the actors’ identities and created more stable expectations of avoiding violence.

**Heg is epistemologically sound**

**Moore 04** – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, pages 41-2.

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come. A useful framework in thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the State, and War,12 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision for war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant. I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who may be disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposing to high risk behavior. We should keep before us, however, the possibility, indeed probability, that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders, and systematically applying other findings of cognitive psychology, as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence in context. A post-Gulf War edition of Gordon Craig and Alexander George's classic, Force and Statecraft,13 presents an important discussion of the inability of the pre-war coercive diplomacy effort to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait without war.14 This discussion, by two of the recognized masters of deterrence theory, reminds us of the many important psychological and other factors operating at the individual level of analysis that may well have been crucial in that failure to get Hussein to withdraw without war. We should also remember that nondemocracies can have differences between leaders as to the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, we should also keep before us that major international war is predominantly and critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three, specifically an absence of democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk.I5 VI Testing the Hypothesis Theory without truth is but costly entertainment. HYPOTHESES, OR PARADIGMS, are useful if they reflect the real world better than previously held paradigms. In the complex world of foreign affairs and the war puzzle, perfection is unlikely. No general construct will fit all cases even in the restricted category of "major interstate war"; there are simply too many variables. We should insist, however, on testing against the real world and on results that suggest enhanced usefulness over other constructs. In testing the hypothesis, we can test it for consistency with major wars; that is, in looking, for example, at the principal interstate wars in the twentieth century, did they present both a nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence?' And although it is by itself not going to prove causation, we might also want to test the hypothesis against settings of potential wars that did not occur. That is, in nonwar settings, was there an absence of at least one element of the synergy? We might also ask questions about the effect of changes on the international system in either element of the synergy; that is, what, in general, happens when a totalitarian state makes a transition to stable democracy or vice versa? And what, in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?

# Framework

#### This educational model is vital to policy and academia– prevents insular education- this answers FIAT isn’t real

Jentleson ‘2 (Bruce W. Jentleson, Source: International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring, 2002), pp. 169-183, “Bringing Policy Relevance Back In”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092106>, Spring 2002, LEQ)

So, a Washington for- eign policy colleague asked, which of your models and theories should I turn to now? What do you academics have to say about September 11? You are sup- posed to be the scholars and students of international affairs-Why did it hap- pen? What should be done? Notwithstanding the surly tone, the questions are not unfair. They do not pertain just to political scientists and international relations scholars; they can be asked of others as well. It falls to each discipline to address these questions as they most pertain to its role. To be sure, political science and international relations have produced and continue to produce scholarly work that does bring important policy insights. Still it is hard to deny that contemporary political science and international relations as a discipline put limited value on policy relevance-too little, in my view, and the discipline suffers for it.1 The problem is not just the gap between theory and policy but its chasmlike widening in recent years and the limited valuation of efforts, in Alexander George's phrase, at "bridging the gap."2 The events of September 11 drive home the need to bring policy relevance back in to the discipline, to seek greater praxis between theory and practice. This is not to say that scholars should take up the agendas of think tanks, journalists, activists, or fast fax operations. The academy's agenda is and should be principally a more scholarly one. But theory can be valued without policy relevance being so undervalued. Dichotomization along the lines of "we" do theory and "they" do policy consigns international relations scholars almost exclusively to an intradisciplinary dialogue and purpose, with conver- sations and knowledge building that while highly intellectual are excessively insular and disconnected from the empirical realities that are the discipline's raison d'etre. This stunts the contributions that universities, one of society's most essential institutions, can make in dealing with the profound problems and challenges society faces. It also is counterproductive to the academy's own interests. Research and scholarship are bettered by pushing analysis and logic beyond just offering up a few paragraphs on implications for policy at the end of a forty-page article, as if a "ritualistic addendum."3 Teaching is enhanced when students' interest in "real world" issues is engaged in ways that reinforce the argument that theory really is relevant, and CNN is not enough. There also are gains to be made for the scholarly community's standing as perceived by those outside the aca- demic world, constituencies and colleagues whose opinions too often are self- servingly denigrated and defensively disregarded. It thus is both for the health of the discipline and to fulfill its broader societal responsibilities that greater praxis is to be pursued. September 11 Questions: Answers from the International Relations Literature? What knowledge is most needed to understand September 11 and the ques- tions posed about its causes, consequences, and the policy agenda it has set? And what answers do political scientists and especially international relations specialists have to offer? Four sets of questions need to be considered.

Don’t focus on representations

Tuathail 96 (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

# Energy Securitization Inevitable

Realism inevitable and good to solve war

Kaplan 11 (Robert, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and author "Libya, Obama and the triumph of realism" Aug 28, [www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a76d2ab4-cf2d-11e0-b6d4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1WPqHMjK3&utm\_source=twitterfeed&utm\_medium=twitter](http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a76d2ab4-cf2d-11e0-b6d4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1WPqHMjK3&utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter), AD: 11/5/11) jl

Realism is dead, clamour the cheerleaders of the Arab spring. The collapse of dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, and now Libya heralds a new birth of freedom that supposedly consigns realism to the graveyard. But Barack Obama – by taking part in the Libyan operation but not leading it – has been nothing if not a realist. Realism, as a theory of international relations, posits that tragedy is not the triumph of evil over good, but instead the triumph of one good over another that causes suffering. It was the US president’s realist views that led him to argue against taking a leadership role in [Libya](http://www.ft.com/intl/indepth/libya-uprising), to keep America’s powder dry for more important crises to come – a demonstrable good. Realism also keeps Mr Obama from owning post-Gaddafi Libya, which is destined, even in the best of circumstances, to be a weak and fragile state. Here he is supporting democracy where he can, and stability where he must. He provides diplomatic support for protesters in Syria but will not intervene. He longs for a democratic rebellion in Iran but fears such a rebellion in Saudi Arabia. That, coupled with his impatience for troop withdrawals in Afghanistan, implies a rejection of nation-building in the Middle East, so as – in effect – to focus on something more crucial: maintaining US maritime power in Asia. Thus does realism triumph. Realism supposedly died at the end of the cold war, when the spread of free societies across eastern Europe highlighted the role of idealism in foreign policy. But then came the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, and the debacle of Iraq, and realism rose from the ashes. It will rise again now, given that the Middle East and East Asia are bound to get messier. Today’s attacks on realism are just as spurious as those that came before. It is said the theory failed the US by providing the rationale to support Arab dictators. But for any foreign policy to stay relevant for so long is itself a mark of success. The US also derived great benefits from this policy: stable bilateral relations and Arab-Israeli peace agreements ensued; trade routes in the Mediterranean and Arabian seas, on which global commerce and energy supplies depend, were made secure. More important, the political and technological conditions for democratic change in the Arab world were not propitious until recently, and the US should never be in the business of demanding revolutionary overthrows across a quarter of the earth for years on end. Realism counsels dealing with the material at hand, not seeking perennially to change it from half a world away. There is also the charge that realism is cynical, and does not therefore represent western values. But realism in the service of the national interest is the most consistently humanitarian approach possible – because realism is about the avoidance of war through the maintenance of a balance of power. The humanitarian interventionism in the Balkans notwithstanding, the greatest humanitarian gesture in living memory was US president Richard Nixon’s trip to China in 1972, engineered by Henry Kissinger, his national security adviser. By dropping the notion that Taiwan was the real China, they obtained China’s agreement to stop supporting communist insurgencies throughout south-east Asia. Also, with the US implicitly providing protection against the Soviet Union and an economically resurgent Japan, China was able to devote itself to the peaceful growth that would lift most of Asia out of poverty. As more than a billion people saw their living standards rise, there was a consequent explosion of personal freedoms. Such can be the wages of realism. Declaring realism dead because of events in the Middle East is also to demonstrate profound ignorance about Asia. There, nationalism is on the rise, as are military budgets. A half-dozen rising naval powers, principally China, have competing claims in the energy-rich South China Sea. This is a world of amoral balance-of-power calculations that will help define the 21st century. The futures of Libya, Yemen and Syria will all be decidedly troubled, even after all their dictators are overthrown, while post-Mubarak Egypt is an economic wreck with Nasserite and Islamist tendencies. In truth, the Middle East is undergoing less a democratic revolution than a crisis in central authority. Because instability is a given, realism – which counsels that interests are paramount in facing a multiplicity of situations – will once again prove to be the only credible belief system for those who, like Mr Obama, seek to wield power.

They can’t solve—violence is hardwired into our brains  
Eisner 9—prof of Comparative & Developmental Criminology, Deputy Director of the Institute, Cambridge. Work revolves around macro-level historical patterns of violence and research on individual development and the causes and prevention of aggressive behavior. PhD in sociology, U Zurich (Manuel, The Uses of Violence: An Examination of Some Cross-Cutting Issues,<http://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/viewArticle/47>, AMiles)

Research from all angles has produced convincing evidence that some features of violence are remarkably similar across time and space. These commonalities comprise: the sex distribution of people involved in fighting (mostly men); the approximate age at which people are most likely to engage in violence (about &' to 0)); essential goals over which fights are fought (material resources, power, and sex); situations that are prone to violence (e.g. humiliations in the presence of others); individual characteristics associated with violence (e.g. courage and risk-seeking); and emotional processes involved in violent encounters (e.g. arousal and anger). Such commonalities are difficult to understand from a purely cultural perspective. Rather, it is becoming increasingly clear that any general theory of violence will need to integrate an evolutionary perspective on human nature (Pinker +,,+). In an insightful paper, Wood (+,,/) has recently laid out how and why an evolutionary perspective is an essential element for the way social scientists understand violence both historically and across societies. On the most general level, an evolutionary perspective serves as a corrective to the view, long cherished amongst social scientists, that the human mind is essentially a blank slate, ready to store and retrieve whatever happens to characterize a given culture (Pinker +,,+). In contrast, evolutionary psychologists emphasize that the “hardwired” architecture of our brain evolved over long periods of time as a solution to the adaptive problems posed by the environmental conditions and problems in the ancestral world (Tooby and Cosmides &((+). Hence the human brain is theorized to be a network of “regulatory circuits” that “organize the way we interpret our experiences, inject certain recurrent concepts and motivations into our mental life, and provide universal frames of meaning that allow us to understand the actions and intentions of others” (Tooby and Cosmides &((/). In developing answers to these questions Buss and Shackelford (&((/) suggest that aggression is a highly context-specific collection of strategies that have evolved as an adaptation to recurrent problems that humans were confronted with during the history of human evolution. They may be grouped into strategies of proactive aggression developed to in#ict costs on rivals and reactive strategies that have developed to deter rivals and to defend one’s interests. The proactive use of aggression entails violence as means to gain access to resources that are valuable for reproduction (land, water, food); as a strategy to win in competitions against intrasexual rivals; and a way to negotiate status and power hierarchies. Reactive uses include strategies where violence is used to defend against attack, situations where it serves as a way to gain a reputation as aggressive in order to deter rivals from future aggression, and reactions that deter longterm mates from sexual infidelity (jealousy).

# Warming

Turn- we need to use the master’s tool – working within the system enables reformism

**Schatz 12** (JL, Binghamton U, "The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-­‐Of-­‐ The-­‐World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism," The Journal of Ecocriticism: Vol 4, No 2 (2012))

Any hesitancy to deploy images of apocalypse out of the risk of acting in a biopolitical manner ignores how any particular metaphor—apocalyptic or not—always risks getting co--‐opted. It does not excuse inaction. Clearly hegemonic forces have already assumed control of determining environmental practices when one looks at the debates surrounding off--‐shore drilling, climate change, and biodiversity within the halls of Congress. “As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems … will go unsolved … only to fester more ominously into the future. … [E]cological crisis … cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context … of internationalized markets, finance, and communications” (Boggs 774). If it weren’t for people such as Watson connecting things like whaling to the end of the world it wouldn’t get the needed coverage to enter into public discourse. It takes big news to make headlines and hold attention spans in the electronic age. Sometimes it even takes a reality TV show on Animal Planet. As Luke reminds us, “Those who dominate the world exploit their positions to their advantage by defining how the world is known. Unless they also face resistance, questioning, and challenge from those who are dominated, theycertainly will remainthedominant forces” (2003: 413). Merely sitting back and theorizing over metaphorical deployments does a grave injustice to the gains activists are making on the ground. It also allows hegemonic institutions to continually define the debate over the environment by framing out any attempt for significant change, whether it be radical or reformist. Only by jumping on every opportunity for resistance can ecocriticism have the hopes of combatting the current ecological reality. This means we must recognize that we cannot fully escape the master’s housesince the surrounding environment always shapes any form of resistance. Therefore, we ought to act even if we may get co--‐opted**.** As Foucault himself reminds us, “instead of radial ruptures more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society that shift about[.] … And it is doubtless the strategic codification of these points of resistance that makes a revolution possible, somewhat similar to the way in which the state relies on the institutional integration of power relationships. It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of power” (96--‐97). Here Foucault “asks us to think about resistance differently, as not anterior to power, but a component of it. If we take seriously these notions on the exercise and circulation of power, then we … open … up the field of possibility to talk about particular kinds of environmentalism” (Rutherford 296). This is not to say that all actions are resistant. Rather, the revolutionary actions that are truly resistant oftentimes appear mundane since it is more about altering the intelligibility that frames discussions around the environment than any specific policy change. Again, this is why people like Watson use one issue as a jumping off point to talk about wider politics of ecological awareness. Campaigns that look to the government or a single policy but for a moment, and then go on to challenge hegemonic interactions with the environment through other tactics, allows us to codify strategic points of resistance in numerous places at once. Again, this does not mean we must agree with every tactic. It does mean that even failed attempts are meaningful. For example, while PETA’s ad campaigns have drawn criticism for comparing factory farms to the Holocaust, and featuring naked women who’d rather go naked than wear fur, their importance extends beyond the ads alone6. By bringing the issues to the forefront they draw upon known metaphors and reframe the way people talk about animals despite their potentially anti--‐Semitic and misogynist underpinnings. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s theorization of the multitude serves as an excellent illustration of how utilizing the power of the master’s biopolitical tools can become powerful enough to deconstruct its house despite the risk of co--‐optation or backlash. For them, the multitude is defined by the growing global force of people around the world who are linked together by their common struggles without being formally organized in a hierarchal way. While Hardt and Negri mostly talk about the multitude in relation to global capitalism, their understanding of the commons and analysis of resistance is useful for any ecocritic. They explain, [T]he multitude has matured to such an extent that it is becoming able, through its networks of communication and cooperation … [and] its production of the common, to sustain an alternative democratic society on its own. … Revolutionary politics must grasp, in the movement of the multitudes and through the accumulation of common and cooperative decisions, the moment of rupture … that can create a new world. In the face of the destructive state of exception of biopower, then, there is also a constituent state of exception of democratic biopolitics[,] … creating … a new constitutive temporality. (357) Once one understands the world as interconnected—instead of constructed by different nation--‐states and single environments—conditions in one area of the globe couldn’t be conceptually severed from any other. In short, we’d all have a stake in the global commons. Ecocritics can then utilize biopolitics to shape discourse and fight against governmental biopower by waking people up to the pressing need to inaugurate a new future for there to be any future. Influencing other people through argument and end--‐of--‐the--‐world tactics is not the same biopower of the state so long as it doesn’t singularize itself but for temporary moments. Therefore, “it is not unreasonable to hope that in a biopolitical future (after the defeat of biopower) war will no longer be possible, and the intensity of the cooperation and communication among singularities … will destroy its [very] possibility” (Hardt & Negri 347). In The context of capitalism, when wealth fails to trickle down it would be seen as a problem for the top since it would stand testament to their failure to equitably distribute wealth. In the context of environmentalism, not--‐in--‐my--‐backyard reasoning that displaces ecological destruction elsewhere would be exposed for the failure that it is. There is no backyard that is not one’s own. Ultimately, images of planetary doom demonstrate how we are all interconnected and in doing so inaugurate a newworld where multitudes, and not governments, guide the fate of the planet.

**Ecosecurity solves k impacts**

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The question of whether it is valid to understand environmental problems as security problems recurs throughout any thoughtful discussion of environmental security. The dilemma should by now be apparent; securitising environmental issues runs the risk that the strategic/realist approach will coopt and colonise the environmental agenda rather than respond positively to environmental problems (as discussed in Chapter 6). For this reason critics of environmental security, such as Deudney (1991) and-Brock (1991), Suggest that it is dangerous to understand environmental problems as security issues: This book's position on the matter has been emerging in previous chapters. It contends that the problem turns not on the presentation of environmental problems as security issues, but on-the meaning and practice of security in present times. Environmental security, wittingly or not, contests the legitimacy of the realist conception of security by pointing to the contradictions of security as the defence of territory and resistance to change. It seeks to work from within the prevailing conception of security, but to be successful it must do so with a strong sense of purpose and a solid theoretical base. Understanding environmental problems as security problems is thus a form of conceptual speculation. It is one manifestation of the pressure the Green movement has exerted on states since the late 1960s. This pressure has pushed state legitimacy nearer to collapse, for if the state cannot control a problem as elemental as environmental degradation, then what is its purpose? This legitimacy problem suggests that environmental degradation cannot further intensify without fundamental change or the collapse of the state. This in turn implies that state-sanctioned environmentally degrading practices such as those undertaken in the name of national security cannot extend their power further if it means further exacerbation of environmental insecurity. While the system may resist environmental security's challenge for change, it must also resist changes for the worse. In terms of the conceptual venture, therefore, appropriation by the security apparatus of the concept of environmental security is unlikely to result in an increase in environmental insecurity (although the concept itself may continue to be corrupted). On the other hand, succeeding in the conceptual venture may mean a positive modification of the theory and practice of national security. It may also mean that national governments will take environmental problems more seriously, reduce defence budgets, and generally implement policies for a more peaceful and environmentally secure world. This dual goal of demilitarisation and upgrading policy may well be a case of wanting to have one's cake and eat it — but either the having or the eating is sufficient justification for the concept (Brock 1996). The worst outcome would be if the state ceased to use the concept of environmental security, heralding the end of the contest and requiring that the interests of peace and the environment be advocated through alternative discourses**.** This is perhaps the only real failure that is likely to ensue from the project of environmental security.